This file is part of IDEAS, which uses RePEc data


[ Papers | Articles | Software | Books | Chapters | Authors | Institutions | JEL Classification | NEP reports | Search | New papers by email | Author registration | Rankings | Volunteers | FAQ | Blog | Help! ]

The symmetric multiple prize all-pay auction with complete information

Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics
Author Info
Barut, Yasar
Kovenock, Dan

Additional information is available for the following registered author(s):

Abstract

No abstract is available for this item.

Download Info
To download:

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. Information about this may be contained in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/B6V97-3V7SMR1-4/2/adfdd80ac1fb3519dc5555ebd2cdaf77
File Format:
File Function:
Download Restriction: Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.

Publisher Info
Article provided by Elsevier in its journal European Journal of Political Economy.

Volume (Year): 14 (1998)
Issue (Month): 4 (November)
Pages: 627-644
Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML (with abstract), plain text (with abstract), BibTeX, RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite), ReDIF
Handle: RePEc:eee:poleco:v:14:y:1998:i:4:p:627-644

Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/505544

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Heidi Boesdal).

Related research
Keywords:

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Benny Moldovanu & Aner Sela, 2001. "The Optimal Allocation of Prizes in Contests," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 91(3), pages 542-558, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  2. Cohen, Daniel & Sela, Aner, 2005. "Contests with Ties," CEPR Discussion Papers 5132, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Sela, Aner, 2009. "Best-of-Three All-Pay Auctions," CEPR Discussion Papers 7224, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Moldovanu, Benny & Sela, Aner & Shi, Xianwen, 2008. "Carrots and Sticks: Prizes and Punishments in Contests," CEPR Discussion Papers 6770, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Paul Schweinzer & Ella Segev, 2008. "The optimal prize structure of symmetric Tullock contests," Discussion Papers 250, SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich. [Downloadable!]
  6. Maria Arbatskaya & Kaushik Mukhopadhaya & Eric Rasmusen, 2007. "The Parking Lot Problem," Working Papers 2007-04, Indiana University, Kelley School of Business, Department of Business Economics and Public Policy. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  7. Aner Sela, 2002. "Contest Architecture (jointly with Benny Moldovanu)," Theory workshop papers 357966000000000088, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  8. Cohen, Chen & Sela, Aner, 2005. "Allocation of Prizes in Asymmetric All-Pay Auctions," CEPR Discussion Papers 4951, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  9. Ian A. MacKenzie, & Nick Hanley & Tatiana Kornienko, 2008. "A Permit Allocation Contest for a Tradable Pollution Permit Market," CER-ETH Economics working paper series 08/82, CER-ETH - Center of Economic Research (CER-ETH) at ETH Zurich. [Downloadable!]
  10. Marco Faravelli & Luca Stanca, 2007. "Single versus Multiple Prize Contests to Finance Public Goods: Theory and Experimental Evidence," Discussion Paper Series, Department of Economics 0715, Department of Economics, University of St. Andrews. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  11. Fu, Qiang & Lu, Jingfeng, 2007. "Unifying Contests: from Noisy Ranking to Ratio-Form Contest Success Functions," MPRA Paper 6617, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  12. Sela, Aner, 2008. "Sequential Two-Prize Contests," CEPR Discussion Papers 6769, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  13. Amegashie, J.A. & Wu, X., 2004. "Self Selection in Competing All-Pay Auctions," Working Papers 2004-1, University of Guelph, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  14. Pradeep Dubey & Siddhartha Sahi, 2009. "The Allocation of a Prize," Department of Economics Working Papers 09-01, Stony Brook University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  15. Ron Seigel, 2009. "Asymmetric Contests with Conditional Investments," Levine's Working Paper Archive 814577000000000201, David K. Levine. [Downloadable!]
  16. Fu, Qiang & Lu, Jingfeng, 2006. "The beauty of "bigness" in contest design: merging or splitting?," MPRA Paper 947, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]
Statistics
Access and download statistics

Did you know? All top Economics journals are listed on RePEc.

This page was last updated on 2009-12-3.


This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Department of Economics, College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, University of Connecticut using RePEc data on a server sponsored by the Society for Economic Dynamics.