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Sequential Two-Prize Contests

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  • Aner Sela

    () (Department of Economics,Ben-Gurion University of the Negev)

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    Abstract

    We study two-stage all-pay auctions with two identical prizes. In each stage, players compete for one prize. Each player may win either one or two prizes. We analyze the equilibrium strategies where players’ marginal values for the prizes are either declining or inclining

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    File URL: http://www.ec.bgu.ac.il/monaster/admin/papers/0803.pdf
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    Bibliographic Info

    Paper provided by Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, Department of Economics in its series Working Papers with number 0803.

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    Length: 17 pages
    Date of creation: 2008
    Date of revision:
    Handle: RePEc:bgu:wpaper:0803

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    Related research

    Keywords: Multi-prize contests; All-pay auctions;

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    References

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    Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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    1. Kaplan, Todd R. & Luski, Israel & Wettstein, David, 2003. "Innovative activity and sunk cost," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 21(8), pages 1111-1133, October.
    2. Cohen, Chen & Kaplan, Todd & Sela, Aner, 2004. "Optimal Rewards in Contests," CEPR Discussion Papers 4704, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    3. Baye, M. & Kovenock, D. & Vries, C. de, 1990. "The All-Pay Auction with Complete Information," Discussion Paper 1990-51, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
    4. Sherwin Rosen, 1985. "Prizes and Incentives in Elimination Tournaments," NBER Working Papers 1668, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    5. Benny Moldovanu & Aner Sela, 2001. "The Optimal Allocation of Prizes in Contests," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 91(3), pages 542-558, June.
    6. Arieh Gavious & Benny Moldovanu & Aner Sela, 2002. "Bid Costs and Endogenous Bid Caps," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 33(4), pages 709-722, Winter.
    7. Che, Yeon-Koo & Gale, Ian L, 1998. "Caps on Political Lobbying," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 88(3), pages 643-51, June.
    8. Jerry R. Green & Nancy L. Stokey, 1982. "A Comparison of Tournaments and Contracts," NBER Working Papers 0840, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    9. Konrad, Kai Andreas, 2005. "Silent interests and all-pay auctions," Discussion Papers, Research Unit: Market Processes and Governance SP II 2005-10, Social Science Research Center Berlin (WZB).
    10. Barut, Yasar & Kovenock, Dan, 1998. "The symmetric multiple prize all-pay auction with complete information," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 14(4), pages 627-644, November.
    11. Vijay Krishna & John Morgan, 1994. "An Analysis of the War of Attrition and the All-Pay Auction," Game Theory and Information 9409002, EconWPA.
    12. Green, Jerry & Stokey, Nancy, 1983. "A Comparison of Tournaments and Contracts," Scholarly Articles 3203644, Harvard University Department of Economics.
    13. Cohen, Chen & Sela, Aner, 2008. "Allocation of prizes in asymmetric all-pay auctions," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 24(1), pages 123-132, March.
    14. Moldovanu, Benny & Sela, Aner, 2006. "Contest architecture," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 126(1), pages 70-96, January.
    15. Clark, Derek J & Riis, Christian, 1998. "Competition over More Than One Prize," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 88(1), pages 276-89, March.
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