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Optimal Contests

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Author Info
Glazer, Amihai
Hassin, Refael

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Abstract

Firms frequently use contests to compensate their employees: an employee's pay depends on the ranking of his output compared to that of others, rather than on the absolute level of his output. This paper analyzes the design of a contest which maximizes the contestants' expected aggregate output and describes two settings which yield opposite results. In one, prizes should be equal except for that given to the contestant with the lowest output. In the other setting, only the contestant with the highest output should obtain a meaningful prize. Copyright 1988 by Oxford University Press.

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Publisher Info
Article provided by Oxford University Press in its journal Economic Inquiry.

Volume (Year): 26 (1988)
Issue (Month): 1 (January)
Pages: 133-43
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Handle: RePEc:oup:ecinqu:v:26:y:1988:i:1:p:133-43

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  1. Yeon-Seung Chung, 1990. "Sorting In Heterogeneous Contests," International Economic Journal, Korean International Economic Association, vol. 4(4), pages 71-89, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Moldovanu, Benny & Sela, Aner & Shi, Xianwen, 2008. "Carrots and Sticks: Prizes and Punishments in Contests," CEPR Discussion Papers 6770, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Marco Faravelli & Luca Stanca, 2007. "Single versus Multiple Prize Contests to Finance Public Goods: Theory and Experimental Evidence," Discussion Paper Series, Department of Economics 0715, Department of Economics, University of St. Andrews. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  4. Benny Moldovanu & Aner Sela, 2001. "The Optimal Allocation of Prizes in Contests," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 91(3), pages 542-558, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  5. Marco Runkel, 2003. "Optimal Contest Design when the Designer's Payoff Depends on Competitive Balance," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo Group Munich. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  6. Marco Runkel, 2006. "Optimal contest design, closeness and the contest success function," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 129(1), pages 217-231, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Yasar Barut & Dan Kovenock & Charles Noussair, 1999. "A Comparison of Multiple-Unit All-Pay and Winner-Pay Auctions Under Incomplete Information," CIG Working Papers FS IV 99-09, Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin (WZB), Research Unit: Competition and Innovation (CIG). [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  8. Jörg Budde, 2005. "Information in tournaments under limited liability," Bonn Econ Discussion Papers bgse21_2005, University of Bonn, Germany. [Downloadable!]
  9. Johannes Münster, 2006. "Selection Tournaments, Sabotage, and Participation," Discussion Papers 118, SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich. [Downloadable!]
  10. Aner Sela, 2002. "Contest Architecture (jointly with Benny Moldovanu)," Theory workshop papers 357966000000000088, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  11. Juan J. Ganuza & Esther Hauk, 2002. "Allocating Ideas: Horizontal Competition in Tournaments," Economics Working Papers 594, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra. [Downloadable!]
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  12. Amihai Glazer & Stef Proost, 2007. "Earmarking: Bundling to Signal Quality," Working Papers 060713, University of California-Irvine, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  13. Fu, Qiang & Lu, Jingfeng, 2007. "Unifying Contests: from Noisy Ranking to Ratio-Form Contest Success Functions," MPRA Paper 6617, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  14. S. Keith Berry, 2006. "Firm Incentives for Invention Prizes with Multiple Winners," Eastern Economic Journal, Eastern Economic Association, vol. 32(1), pages 83-95, Winter. [Downloadable!]
  15. Junichiro Ishida, 2006. "Seniority bias in a tournament," Review of Economic Design, Springer, vol. 10(2), pages 143-164, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  16. Ian A. MacKenzie, & Nick Hanley & Tatiana Kornienko, 2008. "A Permit Allocation Contest for a Tradable Pollution Permit Market," CER-ETH Economics working paper series 08/82, CER-ETH - Center of Economic Research (CER-ETH) at ETH Zurich. [Downloadable!]
  17. Daniel Lee, 2008. "Going once, going twice, sold! The committee assignment process as an all-pay auction," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 135(3), pages 237-255, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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