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Sequential Two-Prize Contests

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Author Info
Sela, Aner
Abstract

We study two-stage all-pay auctions with two identical prizes. In each stage, players compete for one prize. Each player may win either one or two prizes. We analyze the equilibrium strategies where players' marginal values for the prizes are either declining or inclining.

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Paper provided by C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers in its series CEPR Discussion Papers with number 6769.

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Date of creation: Apr 2008
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Handle: RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:6769

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Related research
Keywords: All-pay auctions Multi-prize contests

Find related papers by JEL classification:
D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure and Pricing - - - Auctions
D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information
J31 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs - - - Wage Level and Structure; Wage Differentials
J41 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Particular Labor Markets - - - Labor Contracts

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This page was last updated on 2008-8-19.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Department of Economics, College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, University of Connecticut using RePEc data on a server sponsored by the Society for Economic Dynamics.