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Contests with multi-tasking

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  • Clark, Derek
  • Konrad, Kai A.

Abstract

The standard contest model in which participants compete in a single dimension is well understood and documented. Multi-dimension extensions are possible but are liable to increase the complexity of the contest structure, mitigating one of its main advantages: simplicity. In this paper we propose an extension in which competition ensues in several dimensions and a competitor that wins a certain number of these is awarded a prize. The amount of information needed to run the contest is hence limited to the number of dimensions won by each player. We look at the design of this contest from the point of view of maximizing effort in the contest (per dimension and totally), and show that there will be a tendency to run small contests with few dimensions. The standard Tullock model and its results are encompassed by our framework. -- Die Arbeit untersucht Wettbewerbsstrukturen, in denen die Teilnehmer eines Turniers in mehr als einer beobachtbaren Dimension oder Outputgröße miteinander konkurrieren, und in denen ein Wettbewerber einen Preis gewinnt, wenn er hinsichtlich einer vorgegebenen Anzahl von Dimensionen besser als seine Konkurrenten abschneidet. Es zeigt sich dabei, dass ein Turnierveranstalter, der die Anstrengungen der Turnierteilnehmer maximieren möchte, Turniere mit einer kleinen Anzahl von Outputdimensionen bevorzugen sollte.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Social Science Research Center Berlin (WZB) in its series Discussion Papers, Research Unit: Market Processes and Governance with number SP II 2006-14.

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Date of creation: 2006
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Handle: RePEc:zbw:wzbmpg:spii200614

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Keywords: contest design; multi-tasking; effort incentives;

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References

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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. J. Atsu Amegashie, 2007. "American Idol: should it be a singing contest or a popularity contest?," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 28(16), pages A0.
  2. João Ricardo Faria & Franklin G. Mixon, Jr. & Steven B. Caudill & Samantha J. Wineke, 2014. "Two-Dimensional Effort in Patent-Race Games and Rent-Seeking Contests: The Case of Telephony," Games, MDPI, Open Access Journal, MDPI, Open Access Journal, vol. 5(2), pages 116-126, May.
  3. Pelosse, Yohan, 2011. "Equivalence of optimal noisy-ranking contests and Tullock contests," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 47(6), pages 740-748.
  4. Stefanie Aniela Lehmann, 2008. "When Randomization in Collective Tournaments is Profitable for the Principal," Bonn Econ Discussion Papers, University of Bonn, Germany bgse19_2008, University of Bonn, Germany, revised Mar 2009.

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