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Contests with multi-tasking

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Author Info
Derek J. Clark (Department of Economics and Management, University of Tromsø, N-9037 Tromsø, Norway. Derek.Clark@nfh.uit.no)
Kai A. Konrad (WZB, Reichpietschufer 50, D-10785 Berlin, Germany, and Free University of Berlin. kkonrad@wz-berlin.de)

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Abstract

The standard contest model in which participants compete in a single dimension is well understood and documented. Multi-dimension extensions are possible but are liable to increase the complexity of the contest structure, mitigating one of its main advantages: simplicity. In this paper we propose an extension in which competition ensues in several dimensions and a competitor that wins a certain number of these is awarded a prize. The amount of information needed to run the contest is hence limited to the number of dimensions won by each player. We look at the design of this contest from the point of view of maximizing effort in the contest (per dimension and totally), and show that there will be a tendency to run small contests with few dimensions. The standard Tullock model and its results are encompassed by our framework.

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich in its series Discussion Papers with number 125.

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Date of creation: Aug 2005
Date of revision: May 2006
Handle: RePEc:trf:wpaper:125

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Related research
Keywords: contest design multi-tasking effort incentives

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Models of Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior

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References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Edward P. Lazear & Sherwin Rosen, 1981. "Rank-Order Tournaments as Optimum Labor Contracts," NBER Working Papers 0401, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  2. Kai A. Konrad & Dan Kovenock, 2005. "Equilibrium and Efficiency in the Tug-of-War," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo GmbH. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  3. Klumpp, Tilman & Polborn, Mattias K., 2006. "Primaries and the New Hampshire Effect," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 90(6-7), pages 1073-1114, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  5. Baik, Kyung H & Shogren, Jason F, 1992. "Strategic Behavior in Contests: Comment," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 82(1), pages 359-62, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Matthias Kräkel, 2004. "Tournaments versus Piece Rates under Limited Liability," Discussion Papers 15, SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  7. Epstein, Gil S. & Nitzan, Shmuel, 2004. "Strategic restraint in contests," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 48(1), pages 201-210, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  8. Benny Moldovanu & Aner Sela, 2001. "The Optimal Allocation of Prizes in Contests," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 91(3), pages 542-558, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  9. Che, Yeon-Koo & Gale, Ian L, 1998. "Caps on Political Lobbying," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 88(3), pages 643-51, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  10. Michael R. Baye & Dan Kovenock & Casper G. Vries, 2005. "Comparative Analysis of Litigation Systems: An Auction-Theoretic Approach," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 115(505), pages 583-601, 07. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  11. Gradstein, Mark & Konrad, Kai A, 1999. "Orchestrating Rent Seeking Contests," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 109(458), pages 536-45, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  12. Congleton, Roger D., 1984. "Committees and rent-seeking effort," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 25(1-2), pages 197-209, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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    Other versions:
  14. Snyder, James M, 1989. "Election Goals and the Allocation of Campaign Resources," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 57(3), pages 637-60, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  15. Holmstrom, Bengt & Milgrom, Paul, 1991. "Multitask Principal-Agent Analyses: Incentive Contracts, Asset Ownership, and Job Design," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 7(0), pages 24-52, Special I.
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Full references

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Amegashie, J., 2007. "American Idol: Should it be a Singing Contest or a Popularity Contest?," Working Papers 2007-8, University of Guelph, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  2. Amegashie, J. Atsu, 2007. "American Idol: Should it be a Singing Contest or a Popularity Contest?," MPRA Paper 6300, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]
  3. Amegashie, J. Atsu, 2007. "American Idol: Should it be a Singing Contest or a Popularity Contest?," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo GmbH. [Downloadable!]
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