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Ineffective Prizes In Multi-Dimensional Contests

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  • Aner Sela

    (BGU)

Abstract

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  • Aner Sela, 2022. "Ineffective Prizes In Multi-Dimensional Contests," Working Papers 2205, Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, Department of Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:bgu:wpaper:2205
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    File URL: http://in.bgu.ac.il/en/humsos/Econ/Workingpapers/2205.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Benny Moldovanu & Aner Sela, 2008. "The Optimal Allocation of Prizes in Contests," Springer Books, in: Roger D. Congleton & Arye L. Hillman & Kai A. Konrad (ed.), 40 Years of Research on Rent Seeking 1, pages 615-631, Springer.
    2. Benny Moldovanu & Aner Sela & Xianwen Shi, 2012. "Carrots And Sticks: Prizes And Punishments In Contests," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 50(2), pages 453-462, April.
    3. Alshech, Shahar & Sela, Aner, 2021. "The optimal allocation of prizes in two-stage contests," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 203(C).
    4. Dan Kovenock & Brian Roberson, 2021. "Generalizations of the General Lotto and Colonel Blotto games," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 71(3), pages 997-1032, April.
    5. Maria Arbatskaya & Hugo Mialon, 2010. "Multi-activity contests," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 43(1), pages 23-43, April.
    6. Barut, Yasar & Kovenock, Dan, 1998. "The symmetric multiple prize all-pay auction with complete information," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 14(4), pages 627-644, November.
    7. Paul Schweinzer & Ella Segev, 2012. "The optimal prize structure of symmetric Tullock contests," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 153(1), pages 69-82, October.
    8. Bernhardt, Dan & Ghosh, Meenakshi, 2020. "Positive and negative campaigning in primary and general elections," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 119(C), pages 98-104.
    9. Derek J. Clark & Kai A. Konrad, 2007. "Contests with Multi‐tasking," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 109(2), pages 303-319, June.
    10. J. Amegashie & Marco Runkel, 2007. "Sabotaging Potential Rivals," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 28(1), pages 143-162, January.
    11. Brian Roberson, 2006. "The Colonel Blotto game," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 29(1), pages 1-24, September.
    12. Dmitry Ryvkin, 2011. "Fatigue in Dynamic Tournaments," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 20(4), pages 1011-1041, December.
    13. Feng, Xin & Lu, Jingfeng, 2018. "How to split the pie: Optimal rewards in dynamic multi-battle competitions," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 160(C), pages 82-95.
    14. Aner Sela, 2020. "Optimal allocations of prizes and punishments in Tullock contests," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 49(3), pages 749-771, September.
    15. Deng, Shanglyu & Wang, Xiruo & Wu, Zenan, 2018. "Incentives in lottery contests with draws," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 163(C), pages 1-5.
    16. Robert Akerlof & Richard Holden, 2012. "The nature of tournaments," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 51(2), pages 289-313, October.
    17. Amegashie, J. Atsu, 2012. "Productive versus destructive efforts in contests," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 28(4), pages 461-468.
    18. Kong-Pin Chen, 2003. "Sabotage in Promotion Tournaments," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 19(1), pages 119-140, April.
    19. Oliver Gürtler & Johannes Münster & Petra Nieken, 2013. "Information Policy in Tournaments with Sabotage," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 115(3), pages 932-966, July.
    20. Aner Sela & Oz Tsahi, 2020. "On the optimal allocation of prizes in best-of-three all-pay auctions," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 55(2), pages 255-273, August.
    21. Moldovanu, Benny & Sela, Aner, 2006. "Contest architecture," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 126(1), pages 70-96, January.
    22. Konrad, Kai A, 2000. "Sabotage in Rent-Seeking Contests," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 16(1), pages 155-165, April.
    23. Imhof, Lorens & Kräkel, Matthias, 2014. "Tournaments with gaps," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 122(2), pages 211-214.
    24. Sergiu Hart, 2008. "Discrete Colonel Blotto and General Lotto games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 36(3), pages 441-460, March.
    25. Aner Sela & Eyal Erez, 2013. "Dynamic contests with resource constraints," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 41(4), pages 863-882, October.
    26. Rosen, Sherwin, 1986. "Prizes and Incentives in Elimination Tournaments," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 76(4), pages 701-715, September.
    27. Qiang Fu & Jingfeng Lu, 2012. "The optimal multi-stage contest," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 51(2), pages 351-382, October.
    28. Cohen Chen & Sela Aner, 2007. "Contests with Ties," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 7(1), pages 1-18, December.
    29. Stergios Skaperdas, 1996. "Contest success functions (*)," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 7(2), pages 283-290.
    30. Snyder, James M, 1989. "Election Goals and the Allocation of Campaign Resources," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 57(3), pages 637-660, May.
    31. Klumpp, Tilman & Konrad, Kai A. & Solomon, Adam, 2019. "The dynamics of majoritarian Blotto games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 117(C), pages 402-419.
    32. Maria Arbatskaya & Hugo M. Mialon, 2012. "Dynamic Multi‐Activity Contests," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 114(2), pages 520-538, June.
    33. Baye, Michael R. & Hoppe, Heidrun C., 2003. "The strategic equivalence of rent-seeking, innovation, and patent-race games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 44(2), pages 217-226, August.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Multidimensional contests; Tullock contests; ine¤ective prizes;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Auctions
    • O31 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Innovation; Research and Development; Technological Change; Intellectual Property Rights - - - Innovation and Invention: Processes and Incentives
    • O32 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Innovation; Research and Development; Technological Change; Intellectual Property Rights - - - Management of Technological Innovation and R&D

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