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A contest success function for rankings

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  • Alberto Vesperoni

    (University of Klagenfurt)

Abstract

In a contest, several candidates compete for winning prizes by expending costly efforts. We assume that the outcome of a contest is a ranking, which is an ordered partition of the set of candidates. We consider rankings of any type (i.e., with any number of candidates at each rank), and define a class of success functions that assign probabilities to all rankings of a given type for each configuration of candidates’ efforts. Our framework can be interpreted as the probabilistic choice of a committee that allocates a given set of prizes following a mix of objective and subjective criteria, where the former depend on candidates’ efforts while the latter are random. We axiomatically characterize our class of success functions and illustrate its relevant features to contest games.

Suggested Citation

  • Alberto Vesperoni, 2016. "A contest success function for rankings," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 47(4), pages 905-937, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:47:y:2016:i:4:d:10.1007_s00355-016-0997-5
    DOI: 10.1007/s00355-016-0997-5
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    Cited by:

    1. Cubel, María & Sanchez-Pages, Santiago, 2016. "An axiomatization of difference-form contest success functions," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 131(PA), pages 92-105.
    2. Ewerhart, Christian & Valkanova, Kremena, 2020. "Fictitious play in networks," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 123(C), pages 182-206.
    3. Andonie, Costel & Kuzmics, Christoph & Rogers, Brian W., 2019. "Efficiency-based measures of inequality," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 85(C), pages 60-69.
    4. Sanchez-Pages, Santiago & Cubel, Maria, 2015. "An axiomatization of difference-form contest success functions," 2007 Annual Meeting, July 29-August 1, 2007, Portland, Oregon TN 2015-49, American Agricultural Economics Association (New Name 2008: Agricultural and Applied Economics Association).
    5. Morgan, John & Sisak, Dana, 2016. "Aspiring to succeed: A model of entrepreneurship and fear of failure," Journal of Business Venturing, Elsevier, vol. 31(1), pages 1-21.
    6. Alberto Vesperoni, 2016. "A contest success function for rankings," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 47(4), pages 905-937, December.
    7. Lu, Jingfeng & Wang, Zhewei, 2015. "Axiomatizing multi-prize nested lottery contests: A complete and strict ranking perspective," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 116(C), pages 127-141.
    8. Jingfeng Lu & Zhewei Wang, 2016. "Axiomatization of reverse nested lottery contests," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 47(4), pages 939-957, December.
    9. Bozbay, Irem & Vesperoni, Alberto, 2018. "A contest success function for networks," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 150(C), pages 404-422.
    10. Alberto Vesperoni & Anıl Yıldızparlak, 2019. "Inequality and conflict outbreak," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 53(1), pages 135-173, June.
    11. Christian Ewerhart, 2015. "Contest success functions: the common-pool perspective," ECON - Working Papers 195, Department of Economics - University of Zurich.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • C25 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Single Equation Models; Single Variables - - - Discrete Regression and Qualitative Choice Models; Discrete Regressors; Proportions; Probabilities
    • C70 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - General
    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • D74 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances; Revolutions
    • D81 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty

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