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Contest success function with the possibility of a draw: Axiomatization

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  • Blavatskyy, Pavlo R.
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    Abstract

    In imperfectly discriminating contests the contestants contribute effort to win a prize but the highest contributed effort does not necessarily secure a win. The contest success function (CSF) is the technology that translates an individual's effort into his or her probability of winning. This paper provides an axiomatization of CSF when there is the possibility of a draw (the sum of winning probabilities across all contestants does not add up to one).

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    Bibliographic Info

    Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Mathematical Economics.

    Volume (Year): 46 (2010)
    Issue (Month): 2 (March)
    Pages: 267-276

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    Handle: RePEc:eee:mateco:v:46:y:2010:i:2:p:267-276

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    Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/jmateco

    Related research

    Keywords: Contest success function Draw Logit Axiomatization Irrelevant alternatives Homogeneity Anonymity Imperfectly discriminating;

    References

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    1. Skaperdas, Stergios, 1996. "Contest Success Functions," Economic Theory, Springer, Springer, vol. 7(2), pages 283-90, February.
    2. Onsong Shin & Michael R. Baye, 1999. "Strategic Behavior in Contests: Comment," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 89(3), pages 691-693, June.
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    4. Gradstein, Mark & Konrad, Kai A, 1999. "Orchestrating Rent Seeking Contests," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, Royal Economic Society, vol. 109(458), pages 536-45, October.
    5. Benny Moldovanu & Aner Sela, 2001. "The Optimal Allocation of Prizes in Contests," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 91(3), pages 542-558, June.
    6. J. Amegashie, 2006. "A contest success function with a tractable noise parameter," Public Choice, Springer, Springer, vol. 126(1), pages 135-144, January.
    7. Morgan, John, 2003. " Sequential Contests," Public Choice, Springer, Springer, vol. 116(1-2), pages 1-18, July.
    8. Kyung Hwan Baik, 2004. "Two-Player Asymmetric Contests with Ratio-Form Contest Success Functions," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, Western Economic Association International, vol. 42(4), pages 679-689, October.
    9. Nitzan, Shmuel, 1994. "Modelling rent-seeking contests," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 10(1), pages 41-60, May.
    10. Dixit, Avinash K, 1987. "Strategic Behavior in Contests," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 77(5), pages 891-98, December.
    11. Sherwin Rosen, 1985. "Prizes and Incentives in Elimination Tournaments," NBER Working Papers 1668, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    12. Jack Hirshleifer, 1989. "Conflict and rent-seeking success functions: Ratio vs. difference models of relative success," Public Choice, Springer, Springer, vol. 63(2), pages 101-112, November.
    13. Arye L. Hillman & John G. Riley, 1989. "Politically Contestable Rents And Transfers," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 1(1), pages 17-39, 03.
    14. Stefan Szymanski, 2003. "The Economic Design of Sporting Contests," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 41(4), pages 1137-1187, December.
    15. Nti, Kofi O, 1997. "Comparative Statics of Contests and Rent-Seeking Games," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 38(1), pages 43-59, February.
    16. Dasgupta, Ani & Nti, Kofi O., 1998. "Designing an optimal contest," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 14(4), pages 587-603, November.
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    Cited by:
    1. Hao Jia & Stergios Skaperdas & Samarth Vaidya, 2012. "Contest Functions: Theoretical Foundations and Issues in Estimation," Working Papers, University of California-Irvine, Department of Economics 111214, University of California-Irvine, Department of Economics.
    2. Stauvermann Peter J., 2012. "Accumulation and Growth in the Shadow of Conflicts," Peace Economics, Peace Science, and Public Policy, De Gruyter, De Gruyter, vol. 18(1), pages 1-30, April.
    3. Gil S. Epstein & Yosef Mealem, 2013. "Politicians, Governed vs. Non-Governed Interest Groups and Rent Dissipation," Working Papers, Bar-Ilan University, Department of Economics 2013-09, Bar-Ilan University, Department of Economics.
    4. André De Palma & Soumyanetra Munshi, 2012. "Multi-player, Multi-prize, Imperfectly Discriminating Contests," Working Papers, HAL hal-00683688, HAL.
    5. Corchón, Luis & Dahm, Matthias, 2011. "Welfare maximizing contest success functions when the planner cannot commit," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 47(3), pages 309-317.
    6. PEETERS, Thomas & SZYMANSKI, Stefan, 2012. "Vertical restraints in soccer: Financial fair play and the English Premier League," Working Papers 2012028, University of Antwerp, Faculty of Applied Economics.
    7. Pelosse, Yohan, 2011. "Equivalence of optimal noisy-ranking contests and Tullock contests," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 47(6), pages 740-748.
    8. Hao Jia & Stergios Skaperdas, 2011. "Technologies of Conflict," Working Papers, University of California-Irvine, Department of Economics 101111, University of California-Irvine, Department of Economics.
    9. Wasser, Cédric, 2013. "A note on Bayesian Nash equilibria in imperfectly discriminating contests," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 66(2), pages 180-182.

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