Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login to save this paper or follow this series

Probabilistic choice in games: properties of Rosenthal's t-solutions

Contents:

Author Info

  • Voorneveld, Mark

    ()
    (Dept. of Economics, Stockholm School of Economics)

Abstract

In t-solutions, quantal response equilibria based on the linear probability model as introduced in R.W. Rosenthal (1989, Int. J. Game Theory 18, 273-292), choice probabilities are related to the determination of leveling taxes. The set of t-solutions coincides with the set of Nash equilibria of a game with quadratic control costs. Increasing the rationality of the players allows them to successively eliminate higher levels of strictly dominated actions. Moreover, there exists a path of t-solutions linking uniform randomization to Nash equilibrium.

Download Info

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
File URL: http://swopec.hhs.se/hastef/papers/hastef0542.pdf
Download Restriction: no

Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Stockholm School of Economics in its series Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance with number 542.

as in new window
Length: 15 pages
Date of creation: 28 Oct 2003
Date of revision: 31 Oct 2003
Handle: RePEc:hhs:hastef:0542

Contact details of provider:
Postal: The Economic Research Institute, Stockholm School of Economics, P.O. Box 6501, 113 83 Stockholm, Sweden
Phone: +46-(0)8-736 90 00
Fax: +46-(0)8-31 01 57
Email:
Web page: http://www.hhs.se/
More information through EDIRC

Related research

Keywords: quantal response equilibrium; t-solutions; linear probability model;

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

References

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
as in new window
  1. Jacob K. Goeree & Charles A. Holt, 2001. "Ten Little Treasures of Game Theory and Ten Intuitive Contradictions," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 91(5), pages 1402-1422, December.
  2. Aumann, Robert J. & Maschler, Michael, 1985. "Game theoretic analysis of a bankruptcy problem from the Talmud," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 36(2), pages 195-213, August.
  3. McKelvey Richard D. & Palfrey Thomas R., 1995. "Quantal Response Equilibria for Normal Form Games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 10(1), pages 6-38, July.
  4. Lawrence E. Blume & William R. Zame, 1993. "The Algebraic Geometry of Perfect and Sequential Equilibrium," Game Theory and Information, EconWPA 9309001, EconWPA.
  5. Anderson, Simon P. & Goeree, Jacob K. & Holt, Charles A., 2001. "Minimum-Effort Coordination Games: Stochastic Potential and Logit Equilibrium," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 34(2), pages 177-199, February.
  6. Rosenthal, Robert W, 1989. "A Bounded-Rationality Approach to the Study of Noncooperative Games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, Springer, vol. 18(3), pages 273-91.
  7. Thomson, William, 2003. "Axiomatic and game-theoretic analysis of bankruptcy and taxation problems: a survey," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 45(3), pages 249-297, July.
  8. Mattsson, Lars-Goran & Weibull, Jorgen W., 2002. "Probabilistic choice and procedurally bounded rationality," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 41(1), pages 61-78, October.
  9. John C. Harsanyi & Reinhard Selten, 1988. "A General Theory of Equilibrium Selection in Games," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262582384, December.
  10. Richard Mckelvey & Thomas Palfrey, 1998. "Quantal Response Equilibria for Extensive Form Games," Experimental Economics, Springer, Springer, vol. 1(1), pages 9-41, June.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

Citations

Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
as in new window

Cited by:
  1. P. Herings & Ronald Peeters, 2010. "Homotopy methods to compute equilibria in game theory," Economic Theory, Springer, Springer, vol. 42(1), pages 119-156, January.
  2. Paola Manzini & Marco Mariotti, 2012. "Stochastic Choice and Consideration Sets," CEEL Working Papers, Cognitive and Experimental Economics Laboratory, Department of Economics, University of Trento, Italia 1205, Cognitive and Experimental Economics Laboratory, Department of Economics, University of Trento, Italia.
  3. Reinoud Joosten & Berend Roorda, 2008. "Generalized projection dynamics in evolutionary game theory," Papers on Economics and Evolution 2008-11, Philipps University Marburg, Department of Geography.
  4. Tsakas, Elias & Voorneveld, Mark, 2007. "The target projection dynamic," Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance, Stockholm School of Economics 670, Stockholm School of Economics, revised 13 Aug 2007.
  5. Voorneveld, Mark & Fagraeus Lundström, Helena, 2005. "Strategic equivalence and bounded rationality in extensive form games," Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance, Stockholm School of Economics 605, Stockholm School of Economics.
  6. Reinoud Joosten & Berend Roorda, 2011. "On evolutionary ray-projection dynamics," Computational Statistics, Springer, Springer, vol. 74(2), pages 147-161, October.

Lists

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Corrections

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:hhs:hastef:0542. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Helena Lundin).

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.