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Politics of Randomness

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Author Info
Epstein, Gil S.
Nitzan, Shmuel

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Abstract

The main drawback of the public-policy contest is that the notion of contest success function, a crucial component of the contest model, does not have micro-foundations and, therefore, the random behavior of the government seems ad-hoc. In the present paper we propose a partial micro-foundation for the public-policy contest. The possible rationalization of random government behavior is illustrated in the case of the all-pay auction and Tullock's lottery logit functions. We also clarify how stake asymmetry, lobbying-skill asymmetry and return to lobbying effort determine the relative desirability, from the government's point of view, of these CSFs

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by CESifo Group Munich in its series CESifo Working Paper Series with number CESifo Working Paper No. 803.

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Date of creation: 2002
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Handle: RePEc:ces:ceswps:_803

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Related research
Keywords: interest groups; policy makers; lobbying; public-policy contests; contest success function; rationalization of random government's behavior;

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  1. Gil Epstein & Shmuel Nitzan & Mordechai Schwarz, 2008. "Efforts in two-sided contests," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 136(3), pages 283-291, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Epstein, Gil S & Nitzan, Shmuel, 2004. "Tournaments: There Is More Than Meets the Eye," CEPR Discussion Papers 4306, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  3. Martin Bodenstein & Heinrich Ursprung, 2005. "Political yardstick competition, economic integration, and constitutional choice in a federation:," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 124(3), pages 329-352, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  4. Epstein, Gil S. & Nitzan, Shmuel, 2005. "The Struggle over Migration Policy," IZA Discussion Papers 1533, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA). [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  5. Gil S. Epstein & Shmuel Nitzan, 2005. "Lobbying and Compromise," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo Group Munich. [Downloadable!]
  6. Gil S. Epstein & Ira N. Gang, 2005. "Contests, NGOs and Decentralizing Aid," IZA Discussion Papers 1711, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA). [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  7. Gil Epstein, 2006. "The political economy of population economics," Journal of Population Economics, Springer, vol. 19(2), pages 255-257, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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This page was last updated on 2009-12-14.

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