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Equivalence of optimal noisy-ranking contests and Tullock contests

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  • Pelosse, Yohan

Abstract

We analyze a noisy-ranking contest in which participants compete in several dimensions. The organizer randomly samples a number of dimensions and awards a prize to the most productive agent. When the contest is optimally designed, we establish a structural equivalence between this family of noisy-ranking contests and contests built upon Tullock contest success functions. Our result also shows that in this class of noisy-contests, the profit-maximization problem of the planner can be turned into a stochastic choice problem for a planner who has some deterministic preferences over the contestants’ win probabilities.

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Mathematical Economics.

Volume (Year): 47 (2011)
Issue (Month): 6 ()
Pages: 740-748

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Handle: RePEc:eee:mateco:v:47:y:2011:i:6:p:740-748

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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/jmateco

Related research

Keywords: Contest success function; Equivalent contests; Probabilistic choice;

References

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Cited by:
  1. João Ricardo Faria & Franklin G. Mixon, Jr. & Steven B. Caudill & Samantha J. Wineke, 2014. "Two-Dimensional Effort in Patent-Race Games and Rent-Seeking Contests: The Case of Telephony," Games, MDPI, Open Access Journal, MDPI, Open Access Journal, vol. 5(2), pages 116-126, May.

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