Labor and credit contracts with asymmetric information and bankruptcy
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Elsevier in its journal European Economic Review.
Volume (Year): 40 (1996)
Issue (Month): 8 (November)
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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/eer
Other versions of this item:
- Theofanis Tsoulouhas, . "Labor and Credit Contracts with Asymmetric Information and Bankruptcy," Working Paper Series 20, North Carolina State University, Department of Economics.
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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- Hart, Oliver D, 1983. "Optimal Labour Contracts under Asymmetric Information: An Introduction," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 50(1), pages 3-35, January.
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- Kosmas Marinakis & Theofanis Tsoulouhas, 2006. "Are Tournaments Optimal over Piece Rates under Limited Liability for the Principal?," Working Paper Series 009, North Carolina State University, Department of Economics, revised Sep 2006.
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