This file is part of IDEAS, which uses RePEc data


[ Papers | Articles | Software | Books | Chapters | Authors | Institutions | JEL Classification | NEP reports | Search | New papers by email | Author registration | Rankings | Volunteers | FAQ | Blog | Help! ]

Implicit Contracts, Labor Mobility and Unemployment

Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics
Author Info
Richard J. Arnott
Arthur Hosios
Joseph Stiglitz

Additional information is available for the following registered author(s):

Abstract

Firms' inability to monitor their employees' search effort forces a tradeoff between risk-bearing and incentive considerations when designing employment-related insurance. Since the provision of insurance against firm-specific shocks adversely affects workers' incentives to find better jobs, the optimal contract provides only partial insurance: it prescribes low (high) wages and under (over) employment to encourage workers to leave (stay) at low (high) productivity firms; and it employs quits and layoffs as alternative means of inducing separations at low productivity firms, with the mix depending upon the relative efficiency of the on- and off-the-job search technologies. Our analysis of implicit contracts with asymmetric search information establishes that any consistent explanation for worksharing, layoffs, severance pay, quits and unemployment must focus on questions of labor mobility.

Download Info
To download:

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. Information about this may be contained in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://www.nber.org/papers/w2316.pdf
File Format: application/pdf
File Function:
Download Restriction: Access to the full text is generally limited to series subscribers, however if the top level domain of the client browser is in a developing country or transition economy free access is provided. More information about subscriptions and free access is available at http://www.nber.org/wwphelp.html.

As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.

Publisher Info
Paper provided by National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc in its series NBER Working Papers with number 2316.

Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML (with abstract), plain text (with abstract), BibTeX, RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite), ReDIF
Length:
Date of creation: Mar 1990
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:2316

Note: LS
Contact details of provider:
Postal: National Bureau of Economic Research, 1050 Massachusetts Avenue Cambridge, MA 02138, U.S.A.
Phone: 617-868-3900
Email:
Web page: http://www.nber.org
More information through EDIRC

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: ().

Related research
Keywords:

Other versions of this item:

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)
  1. Jonathan P. Thomas, 2000. "Fair pay and a Wagebill Argument for Wage Rigidity and Excessive Employment Variability," Labor and Demography 0004004, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  2. Bengt Holmstrom, 1980. "Equilibrium Long-Term Labor Contracts," Discussion Papers 414R, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
  3. Burguet, Roberto & Caminal, Ramón, 2004. "Does the Market Provide Sufficient Employment Protection?," CEPR Discussion Papers 4198, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  4. Wang, Yanguo & Jaenicke, Edward C., 2005. "Pooling, Separating, and Cream-Skimming In Relative-Performance Contracts," 2005 International Congress, August 23-27, 2005, Copenhagen, Denmark 24639, European Association of Agricultural Economists. [Downloadable!]
  5. Sherwin Rosen, 1985. "Implicit Contracts: A Survey," NBER Working Papers 1635, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  6. Engström, Per, 2002. "Optimal Non-Linear Income Taxation in Search Equilibrium," Working Paper Series 2002:18, Uppsala University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  7. Wang, Yanguo & Jaenicke, Edward, 2005. "Pooling, Separating, and Cream-Skimming In Relative-Performance Contracts," 2005 Annual meeting, July 24-27, Providence, RI 19522, American Agricultural Economics Association (New Name 2008: Agricultural and Applied Economics Association). [Downloadable!]
  8. Kyyrä, Tomi & Wilke, Ralf A., 2004. "Reduction in the Long-Term Unemployment of the Elderly : A Success Story from Finland," ZEW Discussion Papers 04-63, ZEW - Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung / Center for European Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  9. Tuulia Hakola, 2002. "Economic Incentives and Labour Market Transitions of the Aged Finnish Workforce," Research Reports 89, Government Institute for Economic Research Finland (VATT). [Downloadable!]
  10. Joseph E. Stiglitz, 2002. "Information and the Change in the Paradigm in Economics," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 92(3), pages 460-501, June. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
Statistics
Access and download statistics

Did you know? To receive notification of recent additions to the database, subscribe to the free NEP reports.

This page was last updated on 2009-12-1.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Department of Economics, College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, University of Connecticut using RePEc data on a server sponsored by the Society for Economic Dynamics.