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Fair Pay and a Wagebill Arguement for Wage Rigidity and Excessive Employment Variability

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Jonathan P. Thomas

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Abstract

This paper considers a two-period optimal contracting model in which firms make new hires in the second period subject to the constraint that they cannot pay discriminate either against or in favour of the new hires. Under an assumption on the information available to workers, it is shown that wages are less flexible than needed for efficient employment levels, with the result that too few hires are made in bad states of the world. Unemployment is involuntary. In an extension to the model, there may also be involuntary and excessive layoffs in some states of the world.

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Paper provided by Department of Economics, University of St. Andrews in its series Discussion Paper Series, Department of Economics with number 9919.

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Date of creation: Dec 1999
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Handle: RePEc:san:wpecon:9919

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