Optimal Non-Linear Income Taxation in Search Equilibrium
Abstract
The paper extends the basic Stiglitz (1982) model of optimal income taxation into general search equilibrium. When we extend the basic taxation model to include a more realistic treatment of the labor market, a number of new interesting mechanisms arise. When wages are fixed we find that a "work hour effect" gives the government incentives to lower the marginal tax rate for both high and low skilled workers. The optimal marginal tax on high skilled is thus negative, and the sign for the low skilled marginal tax is ambiguous. With wages determined by bargaining between firm and worker the results are changed. Both marginal tax rates are of ambiguous sign. The tax systems' effects on the wage formation and the unemployment rates may result in new intricate redistribution channels. Simulations show that the marginal tax rate for high skilled is increasing in the level of redistribution when wages are fixed, but decreasing in the level of redistribution when wages are determined by bargaining.Download Info
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Paper provided by Uppsala University, Department of Economics in its series Working Paper Series with number 2002:18.Length: 31 pages
Date of creation: 05 Nov 2002
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:hhs:uunewp:2002_018
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Postal: Department of Economics, Uppsala University, P. O. Box 513, SE-751 20 Uppsala, Sweden
Phone: + 46 18 471 25 00
Fax: + 46 18 471 14 78
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Web page: http://www.nek.uu.se/
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Related research
Keywords: Optimal non-linear income taxation; search; unemployment;Find related papers by JEL classification:
- H21 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Efficiency; Optimal Taxation
- J22 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demand and Supply of Labor - - - Time Allocation and Labor Supply
- J41 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Particular Labor Markets - - - Labor Contracts
- J64 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Mobility, Unemployment, and Vacancies - - - Unemployment: Models, Duration, Incidence, and Job Search
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2002-12-17 (All new papers)
- NEP-PBE-2002-12-17 (Public Economics)
References
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Citations
Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.Cited by:
- Engström, Per, 2003. "Unemployment Benefits and Optimal Non-Linear Income Taxation," Working Paper Series 2003:3, Uppsala University, Department of Economics.
- Engström, Per, 2007. "Wage Formation and Redistribution," Working Paper Series 2007:12, Uppsala University, Department of Economics.
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