Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login

Optimal unemployment insurance with monitoring and sanctions

Contents:

Author Info

  • Boone, Jan

    ()
    (IFAU - Institute for Labour Market Policy Evaluation)

  • Fredriksson, Peter

    ()
    (IFAU - Institute for Labour Market Policy Evaluation)

  • Holmlund, Bertil

    ()
    (IFAU - Institute for Labour Market Policy Evaluation)

  • van Ours, Jan

    ()
    (IFAU - Institute for Labour Market Policy Evaluation)

Abstract

This paper analyzes the design of optimal unemployment insurance in a search equilibrium framework where search effort among the unemployed is not perfectly observable. We examine to what extent the optimal policy involves monitoring of search effort and benefit sanctions if observed search is deemed insufficient. We find that introducing monitoring and sanctions represents a welfare improvement for reasonable estimates of monitoring costs; this conclusion holds both relative to a system featuring indefinite payments of benefits and a system with a time limit on unemployment benefit receipt.

Download Info

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
File URL: http://www.ifau.se/upload/pdf/se/2002/wp02-21.pdf
Download Restriction: no

Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by IFAU - Institute for Evaluation of Labour Market and Education Policy in its series Working Paper Series with number 2002:21.

as in new window
Length: 29 pages
Date of creation: 26 Nov 2002
Date of revision:
Publication status: Published in Economic Journal, 2007, pages 399-421.
Handle: RePEc:hhs:ifauwp:2002_021

Contact details of provider:
Postal: IFAU, P O Box 513, SE-751 20 Uppsala, Sweden
Phone: (+46) 18 - 471 70 70
Fax: (+46) 18 - 471 70 71
Email:
Web page: http://www.ifau.se/
More information through EDIRC

Related research

Keywords: Unemployment insurance; search; sanctions;

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

References

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
as in new window
  1. Sorensen, Peter Birch, 1999. "Optimal tax progressivity in imperfect labour markets," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 6(3), pages 435-452, September.
  2. van den Bergh, Gerhard & van deer Klaauw, Bas, 2001. "Counseling and monitoring of unemployed workers: theory and evidence from a controlled social experiment," Working Paper Series 2001:12, IFAU - Institute for Evaluation of Labour Market and Education Policy.
  3. Henrik Jacobsen Kleven & Wolfram F. Richter & Peter Birch Sørensen, . "Optimal Taxation with Household Production," EPRU Working Paper Series 99-12, Economic Policy Research Unit (EPRU), University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics.
  4. Nordström Skans, Oskar, 2002. "Age effects in Swedish local labour markets," Working Paper Series 2002:11, IFAU - Institute for Evaluation of Labour Market and Education Policy.
  5. Dale T. Mortensen, 1977. "Unemployment insurance and job search decisions," Industrial and Labor Relations Review, ILR Review, Cornell University, ILR School, vol. 30(4), pages 505-517, July.
  6. Skedinger, Per, 2002. "Minimum wages and employment in Swedish hotels and restaurants," Working Paper Series 2002:18, IFAU - Institute for Evaluation of Labour Market and Education Policy.
  7. C. Benassi & A. E. Scorcu, 2002. "Indexation Rules, Risk Aversion, and Imperfect Information," Working Papers 450, Dipartimento Scienze Economiche, Universita' di Bologna.
  8. Kolm, Ann-Sofie, 1998. "Differentiated payroll taxes, unemployment, and welfare," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 70(2), pages 255-271, November.
  9. Phelps, Edmund S & Zoega, Gylfi, 1998. "Natural-Rate Theory and OECD Unemployment," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 108(448), pages 782-801, May.
  10. van den Berg, Gerard J & van der Klaauw, Bas & van Ours, Jan C, 2000. "Punitive Sanctions and the Transition Rate From Welfare to Work," CEPR Discussion Papers 2447, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  11. Steven Shavell & Laurence Weiss, 1978. "The Optimal Payment of Unemployment Insurance Benefits over Time," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 503, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
  12. Bertil Holmlund & Ann-Sofie Kolm, 2000. "International Spillover Effects of Sectoral Tax Differentiation in Unionized Economies," CESifo Working Paper Series 295, CESifo Group Munich.
  13. Boone, J. & Bovenberg, A.L., 2000. "Optimal Labour Taxation and Search," Discussion Paper 2000-17, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
  14. Boone, Jan & van Ours, Jan C., 2000. "Modeling Financial Incentives to Get Unemployed Back to Work," IZA Discussion Papers 108, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
  15. Christopher A. Pissarides, 1997. "The Impact of Employment Tax Cuts on Unemployment and Wages: The Role of Unemployment Benefits and Tax Structure," CEP Discussion Papers dp0361, Centre for Economic Performance, LSE.
  16. Bertil Holmlund, 2001. "Labor Taxation in Search Equilibrium with Home Production," CESifo Working Paper Series 462, CESifo Group Munich.
  17. Arulampalam, W. & Robin A. Naylor & Jeremy P. Smith, 2002. "University of Warwick," Royal Economic Society Annual Conference 2002 9, Royal Economic Society.
  18. Fredriksson, P. & Holmlund, B., 1998. "Optimal Unemployment Insurance in Search Equilibrium," Papers 1998-2, Uppsala - Working Paper Series.
  19. Sacklén, Hans, 2002. "An evaluation of the Swedish trainee replacement schemes," Working Paper Series 2002:7, IFAU - Institute for Evaluation of Labour Market and Education Policy.
  20. Boone, Jan & Fredriksson, Peter & Holmlund, Bertil & van Ours, Jan, 2001. "Optimal Unemployment Insurance with Monitoring and Sanctions," Working Paper Series 2001:20, Uppsala University, Department of Economics.
  21. Hoon, Hian Teck & Phelps, Edmund S., 1997. "Growth, wealth and the natural rate: Is Europe's jobs crisis a growth crisis?," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 41(3-5), pages 549-557, April.
  22. Lindeboom, Maarten & Portrait, France & van den Berg, Gerard, 2002. "An econometric analysis of the mental-health effects of major events in the life of older individuals," Working Paper Series 2002:19, IFAU - Institute for Evaluation of Labour Market and Education Policy.
  23. Niels Fredriksen & Peter Hansen & Henrik Jacobsen & Peter Sørensen, 1995. "Subsidising consumer services: effects on employment, welfare and the informal economy," Fiscal Studies, Institute for Fiscal Studies, vol. 16(2), pages 71-93, May.
  24. Kolm, Ann-Sofie, 2000. " Labour Taxation in a Unionised Economy with Home Production," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 102(4), pages 689-705, December.
  25. Garoupa, Nuno, 1997. " The Theory of Optimal Law Enforcement," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 11(3), pages 267-95, September.
  26. Calmfors, Lars & Forslund, Anders & Hemström, Maria, 2002. "Does active labour market policy work? Lessons from the Swedish experiences," Working Paper Series 2002:4, IFAU - Institute for Evaluation of Labour Market and Education Policy.
  27. Bovenberg, A Lans & van der Ploeg, Frederick, 1998. " Tax Reform, Structural Unemployment and the Environment," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 100(3), pages 593-610, September.
  28. Broström, Göran & Palme, Mårten & Johansson, Per, 2002. "Economic incentives and gender differences in work absence behavior," Working Paper Series 2002:14, IFAU - Institute for Evaluation of Labour Market and Education Policy.
  29. P. B. Sørensen, 1997. "Public finance solutions to the European unemployment problem?," Economic Policy, CEPR & CES & MSH, vol. 12(25), pages 221-264, October.
  30. Jaap H. Abbring & Gerard J. Berg & Jan C. Ours, 2005. "The Effect of Unemployment Insurance Sanctions on the Transition Rate from Unemployment to Employment," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 115(505), pages 602-630, 07.
  31. Eriksson, Stefan, 2002. "Imperfect information, wage formation, and the employability of the unemployed," Working Paper Series 2002:17, IFAU - Institute for Evaluation of Labour Market and Education Policy.
  32. Flemming, J. S., 1978. "Aspects of optimal unemployment insurance : Search, leisure, savings and capital market imperfections," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 10(3), pages 403-425, December.
  33. Dan A. Black & Jeffrey A. Smith & Mark C. Berger & Brett J. Noel, 1999. "Is the Threat of Training More Effective Than Training Itself? Experimental Evidence from the UI System," UWO Department of Economics Working Papers 9913, University of Western Ontario, Department of Economics.
  34. Mortensen, Dale T & Pissarides, Christopher, 2001. "Taxes, Subsidies and Equilibrium Labour Market Outcomes," CEPR Discussion Papers 2989, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  35. Johansson, Per & Palme, Mårten, 2001. "Assessing the effect of public policy on worker absenteeism," Working Paper Series 2002:13, IFAU - Institute for Evaluation of Labour Market and Education Policy.
  36. Hopenhayn, Hugo A & Nicolini, Juan Pablo, 1997. "Optimal Unemployment Insurance," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 105(2), pages 412-38, April.
  37. Sandmo, Agnar, 1990. "Tax Distortions and Household Production," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 42(1), pages 78-90, January.
  38. Hian Hoon, 1996. "Payroll taxes and VAT in a labor-turnover model of the ‘natural rate’," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer, vol. 3(3), pages 369-383, July.
  39. Cahuc, Pierre & Lehmann, Etienne, 2000. "Should unemployment benefits decrease with the unemployment spell?," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 77(1), pages 135-153, July.
  40. Abbring, Jaap H. & van den Berg, Gerard J., 2002. "Dynamically assigned treatments: duration models, binary treatment models, and panel data models," Working Paper Series 2002:20, IFAU - Institute for Evaluation of Labour Market and Education Policy.
  41. A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, 1999. "The Economic Theory of Public Enforcement of Law," NBER Working Papers 6993, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  42. Terry R. Johnson & Daniel H. Klepinger, 1994. "Experimental Evidence on Unemployment Insurance Work-Search Policies," Journal of Human Resources, University of Wisconsin Press, vol. 29(3), pages 665-717.
  43. repec:rus:hseeco:10108 is not listed on IDEAS
  44. Baily, Martin Neil, 1978. "Some aspects of optimal unemployment insurance," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 10(3), pages 379-402, December.
  45. Hosios, Arthur J, 1990. "On the Efficiency of Matching and Related Models of Search and Unemployment," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 57(2), pages 279-98, April.
  46. Johansson, Kerstin, 2002. "Labor market programs, the discouraged-worker effect, and labor force participation," Working Paper Series 2002:9, IFAU - Institute for Evaluation of Labour Market and Education Policy.
  47. Johansson, Kerstin, 2002. "Labor Market Programs, the Discouraged-Worker Effect, and Labor Force Participation," Working Paper Series 2002:16, Uppsala University, Department of Economics.
  48. Berg, G. van den & Klaauw, B. van der & Ours, J.C. van, 1998. "Punitive sanctions and the transition from welfare to work," Discussion Paper 1998-56, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

Citations

Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
as in new window

Cited by:
This item has more than 25 citations. To prevent cluttering this page, these citations are listed on a separate page.

Lists

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Corrections

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:hhs:ifauwp:2002_021. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Margareta Wicklander).

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.