This file is part of IDEAS, which uses RePEc data


[ Papers | Articles | Software | Books | Chapters | Authors | Institutions | JEL Classification | NEP reports | Search | New papers by email | Author registration | Rankings | Volunteers | FAQ | Blog | Help! ]

Optimal Unemployment Insurance Design: Time Limits, Monitoring, or Workfare?

Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics
Author Info
Peter Fredriksson ()
Bertil Holmlund ()

Additional information is available for the following registered author(s):

Abstract

This paper analyses crucial design features of unemployment insurance (UI) policies. We examine three different means of improving the efficiency of UI: the duration of benefit payments, monitoring in conjunction with sanctions, and workfare. To that end we develop a quantitative model of equilibrium unemployment. The model features worker heterogeneity, which takes the form of differences in preferences for leisure. All the instruments are ways of limiting the duration of UI benefit receipt and the model can be used to compare them in a coherent fashion. The analysis suggests that a system with monitoring and sanctions restores search incentives most effectively, since it brings additional incentives to search actively so as to avoid the sanction. Therefore, the UI provider can offer a more generous UI replacement rate in a system with monitoring and sanctions than in the other two systems. Workfare appears to be inferior to the other two systems.

Download Info
To download:

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. Information about this may be contained in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help file. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://www.cesifo-group.de/DocCIDL/cesifo1_wp1019.pdf
File Format: application/pdf
File Function:
Download Restriction: no

Publisher Info
Paper provided by CESifo GmbH in its series CESifo Working Paper Series with number CESifo Working Paper No. 1019.

Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML, plain text, BibTeX, RIS (EndNote), ReDIF
Length:
Date of creation: 2003
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:ces:ceswps:_1019

Contact details of provider:
Postal: Poschingerstrasse 5, 81679 Munich
Phone: +49 (89) 9224-0
Fax: +49 (89) 985369
Web page: http://www.cesifo.de

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Julio Saavedra).

Related research
Keywords: unemployment insurance search monitoring sanctions workfare

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:
J64 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Mobility, Unemployment, and Vacancies - - - Unemployment: Models, Duration, Incidence, and Job Search
J65 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Mobility, Unemployment, and Vacancies - - - Unemployment Insurance; Severance Pay; Plant Closings
J68 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Mobility, Unemployment, and Vacancies - - - Public Policy

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Boone, Jan & Fredriksson, Peter & Holmlund, Bertil & van Ours, Jan, 2002. "Optimal unemployment insurance with monitoring and sanctions," Working Paper Series 2002:21, IFAU - Institute for Labour Market Policy Evaluation. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  2. Paul Beaudry & Charles Blackorby, 1998. "Taxes and Employment Subsidies in Optimal Redistribution Programs," NBER Working Papers 6355, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  3. Boone, Jan & van Ours, Jan C., 2000. "Modeling Financial Incentives to Get Unemployed Back to Work," IZA Discussion Papers 108, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA). [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  4. Claus Thustrup Kreiner & Torben Tranæs, 2003. "Optimal Workfare with Voluntary and Involuntary Unemployment," EPRU Working Paper Series 03-15, Economic Policy Research Unit (EPRU), University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics, revised Aug 2004. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  5. Lalive, Rafael & van Ours, Jan C. & Zweimüller, Josef, 2002. "The Effect of Benefit Sanctions on the Duration of Unemployment," IZA Discussion Papers 469, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA). [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  6. Hassler, John & Rodríguez Mora, José V., 2002. "Should UI Benefits Really Fall Over Time?," IZA Discussion Papers 622, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA). [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  7. Fredriksson, Peter & Holmlund, Bertil, 2003. "Improving Incentives in Unemployment Insurance: A Review of Recent Research," Working Paper Series 2003:10, Uppsala University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  8. Jaap H. Abbring & Gerard J. Berg & Jan C. Ours, 2005. "The Effect of Unemployment Insurance Sanctions on the Transition Rate from Unemployment to Employment," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 115(505), pages 602-630, 07. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  9. Gerard van den Berg & Bas van der Klaauw, 2000. "Counseling and Monitoring of Unemployed Workers: Theory and Evidence from a Social Experiment," Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers 0972, Econometric Society. [Downloadable!]
  10. Davidson, Carl & Woodbury, Stephen A., 1997. "Optimal unemployment insurance," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 64(3), pages 359-387, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  11. Olivier Jean Blanchard & Peter Diamond, 1990. "The Beveridge Curve," NBER Reprints 1405, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    Other versions:
  12. Fredriksson, Peter & Holmlund, Bertil, 2001. "Optimal Unemployment Insurance in Search Equilibrium," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 19(2), pages 370-99, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  13. Hosios, Arthur J, 1990. "On the Efficiency of Matching and Related Models of Search and Unemployment," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 57(2), pages 279-98, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  14. Besley, T. & Coate, S., 1991. "The Design Of Income Maintenance Programs," Papers 74, Princeton, Woodrow Wilson School - John M. Olin Program.
    Other versions:
  15. Dan A. Black & Jeffrey A. Smith & Mark C. Berger & Brett J. Noel, 2003. "Is the Threat of Reemployment Services More Effective than the Services Themselves? Evidence from Random Assignment in the UI System," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 93(4), pages 1313-1327, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  16. Cahuc, Pierre & Lehmann, Etienne, 2000. "Should unemployment benefits decrease with the unemployment spell?," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 77(1), pages 135-153, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  17. Shavell, Steven & Weiss, Laurence, 1979. "The Optimal Payment of Unemployment Insurance Benefits over Time," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 87(6), pages 1347-62, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  18. Hopenhayn, Hugo A & Nicolini, Juan Pablo, 1997. "Optimal Unemployment Insurance," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 105(2), pages 412-38, April.
    Other versions:
Full references

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Fredriksson, Peter & Holmlund, Bertil, 2003. "Improving Incentives in Unemployment Insurance: A Review of Recent Research," Working Paper Series 2003:10, Uppsala University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  2. Christian Holzner & Volker Meier & Martin Werding, 2006. "Workfare, Monitoring, and Efficiency Wages," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo GmbH. [Downloadable!]
  3. Cockx, Bart & Ries, Jean, 2004. "The Exhaustion of Unemployment Benefits in Belgium: Does it Enhance the Probability of Employment?," IZA Discussion Papers 1177, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA). [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  4. Gabriele, CARDULLO & Bruno, VANDERLINDEN, 2006. "Employment subsidies and substitutable skills : An equilibrium matching approach," Université catholique de Louvain, Département des Sciences Economiques Working Paper 2006010, Université catholique de Louvain, Département des Sciences Economiques. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  5. Blomquist, Sören & Christiansen, Vidar, 2004. "Taxation and Heterogeneous Preferences," Working Paper Series 2004:9, Uppsala University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  6. Aronsson, Thomas & Blomquist, Sören, 2004. "Redistribution and Provision of Public Goods in an Economic Federation," Working Paper Series 2004:4, Uppsala University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  7. Koch, Susanne & Stephan, Gesine & Walwei, Ulrich, 2005. "Workfare: Möglichkeiten und Grenzen," IAB Discussion Paper 200517, Institut für Arbeitsmarkt- und Berufsforschung (IAB), Nürnberg [Institute for Employment Research, Nuremberg, Germany]. [Downloadable!]
  8. Hägglund, Pathric, 2006. "Are there pre-programme effects of Swedish active labour market policies? Evidence from three randomised experiments," Working Paper Series 2006:2, IFAU - Institute for Labour Market Policy Evaluation. [Downloadable!]
  9. Wolfgang Ochel, 2004. "Welfare-to-Work Experiences with Specific Work-First Programmes in Selected Countries," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo GmbH. [Downloadable!]
  10. Torben M. Andersen & Michael Svarer, 2007. "Flexicurity – labour market performance in Denmark," Economics Working Papers 2007-09, School of Economics and Management, University of Aarhus. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
Statistics
Access and download statistics

Did you know? You too can volunteer for RePEc, for example by providing information about publications in your institution.

This page was last updated on 2008-9-22.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Department of Economics, College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, University of Connecticut using RePEc data on a server sponsored by the Society for Economic Dynamics.