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Optimal Unemployment Insurance in a Matching Equilibrium

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Author Info
Adrian Masters
Melvyn Coles

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Abstract

This paper considers the optimal design of unemployment insurance (UI) within an equilibrium matching framework when wages are determined by strategic bargaining. Unlike the Nash bargaining approach, reducing UI payments with duration is welfare increasing. A co-ordinated policy approach, however, one that chooses job creation subsidies and UI optimally, implies a much greater welfare gain than one which considers optimal UI alone. Once job creation subsidies are chosen optimally, the welfare value of making UI payments duration dependent is small.

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by University at Albany, SUNY, Department of Economics in its series Discussion Papers with number 04-12.

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Date of creation: 2004
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Handle: RePEc:nya:albaec:04-12

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Postal: Department of Economics, BA 110 University at Albany State University of New York Albany, NY 12222 U.S.A.
Phone: (518) 442-4735
Fax: (518) 442-4736

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Postal: Department of Economics, BA 110 University at Albany State University of New York Albany, NY 12222 U.S.A.
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Web: http://www.albany.edu/econ/dp/index.html

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References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Coles, Melvyn G. & Wright, Randall, 1998. "A Dynamic Equilibrium Model of Search, Bargaining, and Money," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 78(1), pages 32-54, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  2. Hansen, Gary D., 1985. "Indivisible labor and the business cycle," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 16(3), pages 309-327, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Adrian Masters & Melvyn Coles, 2004. "Duration Dependent Unemployment Insurance and Stabilisation Policy," Discussion Papers 04-10, University at Albany, SUNY, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  4. Davidson, Carl & Woodbury, Stephen A., 1997. "Optimal unemployment insurance," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 64(3), pages 359-387, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  5. Daron Acemoglu & Robert Shimer, 1999. "Efficient Unemployment Insurance," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 107(5), pages 893-928, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  6. Ausubel, Lawrence M & Deneckere, Raymond J, 1989. "Reputation in Bargaining and Durable Goods Monopoly," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 57(3), pages 511-31, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Olivier Jean Blanchard & Peter Diamond, 1990. "The Beveridge Curve," NBER Reprints 1405, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
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  8. Fredriksson, Peter & Holmlund, Bertil, 2001. "Optimal Unemployment Insurance in Search Equilibrium," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 19(2), pages 370-99, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  9. Albrecht, James & Vroman, Susan, 2001. "Equilibrium Search with Time-Varying Unemployment Benefits," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo GmbH. [Downloadable!]
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  10. Hosios, Arthur J, 1990. "On the Efficiency of Matching and Related Models of Search and Unemployment," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 57(2), pages 279-98, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  11. James Albrecht & Susan Vroman, 2002. "A Matching Model with Endogenous Skill Requirements," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 43(1), pages 283-305, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  12. Cole, Harold L & Rogerson, Richard, 1999. "Can the Mortensen-Pissarides Matching Model Match the Business-Cycle Facts?," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 40(4), pages 933-59, November.
  13. Coles, Melvyn G & Hildreth, Andrew K G, 2000. "Wage Bargaining, Inventories, and Union Legislation," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 67(2), pages 273-93, April.
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  14. James Costain, 1997. "Unemployment Insurance with Endogenous Search Intensity and Precautionary Saving," Economics Working Papers 243, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra. [Downloadable!]
  15. Cahuc, Pierre & Lehmann, Etienne, 2000. "Should unemployment benefits decrease with the unemployment spell?," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 77(1), pages 135-153, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  16. Shavell, Steven & Weiss, Laurence, 1979. "The Optimal Payment of Unemployment Insurance Benefits over Time," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 87(6), pages 1347-62, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  17. Hopenhayn, Hugo A & Nicolini, Juan Pablo, 1997. "Optimal Unemployment Insurance," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 105(2), pages 412-38, April.
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Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Javier Ortega & Laurence Rioux, 2007. "On the Extent of Re-Entitlement Effects in Unemployment Compensation," IZA Discussion Papers 2807, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA). [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  2. Giulio Fella, 2007. "Optimal Severance Pay in a Matching Model," Working Papers 07-02, Utrecht School of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  3. Gabriele, CARDULLO & Bruno, VANDERLINDEN, 2006. "Employment subsidies and substitutable skills : An equilibrium matching approach," Université catholique de Louvain, Département des Sciences Economiques Working Paper 2006010, Université catholique de Louvain, Département des Sciences Economiques. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  4. Reichling, Felix, 2006. "Optimal Unemployment Insurance in Labor Market Equilibrium when Workers can Self-Insure," MPRA Paper 5362, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 16 Oct 2007. [Downloadable!]
  5. Javier Ortega & Laurence Rioux, 2008. "On the Extent of Re-Entitlement Effects in Unemployment Compensation," CEP Discussion Papers dp0846, Centre for Economic Performance, LSE. [Downloadable!]
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