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On the Optimality of Search Matching Equilibrium when workers are risk adverse

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E. LEHMANN
B. VAN DER LINDEN

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Paper provided by ERMES, University Paris 2 in its series Working Papers ERMES with number 0406.

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Date of creation: 04 Mar 2004
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Handle: RePEc:erm:papers:0406

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  1. Robin Boadway & Katherine Cuff, 1999. "Monitoring Job Search as an Instrument for Targeting Transfers," Cahiers de recherche CREFE / CREFE Working Papers 71, CREFE, Université du Québec à Montréal. [Downloadable!]
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  2. Boone, J. & Ours, J.C. van, 2000. "Modeling financial incentives to get unemployed back to work," Discussion Paper 2, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
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  3. Lockwood, Ben & Manning, Alan, 1993. "Wage setting and the tax system theory and evidence for the United Kingdom," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 52(1), pages 1-29, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Mathias, HUNGERBUELHER & Etienne, LEHMANN & Alexis PARMENTIER & Bruno VAN DER LINDEN, 2003. "Optimal Income Taxation in an Equilibrium Unemployment Model : Mirrlees meets Pissarides," Discussion Papers (IRES - Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales) 2003024, Université catholique de Louvain, Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales (IRES). [Downloadable!]
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  5. Pissarides, Christopher A., 1998. "The impact of employment tax cuts on unemployment and wages; The role of unemployment benefits and tax structure," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 42(1), pages 155-183, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  6. Holmlund, Bertil, 1998. " Unemployment Insurance in Theory and Practice," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 100(1), pages 113-41, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  7. Boone, Jan & Fredriksson, Peter & Holmlund, Bertil & van Ours, Jan C, 2001. "Optimal Unemployment Insurance with Monitoring and Sanctions," CEPR Discussion Papers 3082, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  8. Fredriksson, Peter & Holmlund, Bertil, 2001. "Optimal Unemployment Insurance in Search Equilibrium," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 19(2), pages 370-99, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  9. Mirrlees, James A, 1971. "An Exploration in the Theory of Optimum Income Taxation," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 38(114), pages 175-208, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  10. Sorensen, Peter Birch, 1999. "Optimal tax progressivity in imperfect labour markets," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 6(3), pages 435-452, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  11. Hosios, Arthur J, 1990. "On the Efficiency of Matching and Related Models of Search and Unemployment," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 57(2), pages 279-98, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  12. Layard, R. & Nickell, S., . "Layard-Nickell," Instructional Stata datasets for econometrics layardnickell, Boston College Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  13. Hopenhayn, Hugo A & Nicolini, Juan Pablo, 1997. "Optimal Unemployment Insurance," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 105(2), pages 412-38, April.
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  14. Fuest, Clemens & Huber, Bernd, 2000. "Is tax progression really good for employment? A model with endogenous hours of work," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 7(1), pages 79-93, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  15. Manning, Alan, 2004. "Monopsony and the efficiency of labour market interventions," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 11(2), pages 145-163, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  16. Boone, Jan & Bovenberg, Lans, 2002. "Optimal labour taxation and search," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 85(1), pages 53-97, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  17. Emmanuel Saez, 2002. "Optimal Income Transfer Programs: Intensive Versus Extensive Labor Supply Responses," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 117(3), pages 1039-1073, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  18. Sherwin Rosen, 1985. "Implicit Contracts: A Survey," NBER Working Papers 1635, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  19. Boone, Jan & Bovenberg, Lans, 2004. "The optimal taxation of unskilled labor with job search and social assistance," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 88(11), pages 2227-2258, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  20. Jan Boone & Ruud Mooij, 2000. "Tax Policy in a Model of Search with Training," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo Group Munich. [Downloadable!]
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  21. Cahuc, Pierre & Lehmann, Etienne, 2000. "Should unemployment benefits decrease with the unemployment spell?," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 77(1), pages 135-153, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  22. Barbara Petrongolo & Christopher A. Pissarides, 2001. "Looking into the Black Box: A Survey of the Matching Function," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 39(2), pages 390-431, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  23. Shavell, Steven & Weiss, Laurence, 1979. "The Optimal Payment of Unemployment Insurance Benefits over Time," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 87(6), pages 1347-62, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Bruno, VAN DER LINDEN, 2003. "Unemployment insurance and training in an equilibrium matching model with heterogeneous agents," Discussion Papers (IRES - Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales) 2003001, Université catholique de Louvain, Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales (IRES). [Downloadable!]
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  2. Van der Linden, Bruno, 2005. "Equilibrium Evaluation of Active Labor Market Programmes Enhancing Matching Effectiveness," IZA Discussion Papers 1526, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA). [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  3. Alexis, PARMENTIER, 2006. "The effects of the marginal tax rate in a matching model with endogenous labor supply," Discussion Papers (ECON - Département des Sciences Economiques) 2006011, Université catholique de Louvain, Département des Sciences Economiques. [Downloadable!]
  4. Garibaldi, Pietro & Wasmer, Etienne, 2003. "Equilibrium Search Unemployment, Endogenous Participation and Labour Market Flows," CEPR Discussion Papers 3986, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  5. Hungerbühler, Mathias & Lehmann, Etienne & Parmentier, Alexis & Van der Linden, Bruno, 2005. "Optimal Redistributive Taxation in a Search Equilibrium Model," IZA Discussion Papers 1460, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA). [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  6. Benoit Julien & John Kennes & Ian King & Sephorah Mangin, 2008. "Directed Search, Unemployment and Public Policy," Department of Economics - Working Papers Series 1049, The University of Melbourne. [Downloadable!]
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