How to Add Apples and Pears: Non-Symmetric Nash Bargaining and the Generalized Joint Surplus
AbstractWe generalize the equivalence of the non-symmetric Nash bargaining solution and the linear division of the joint surplus when bargainers use different utility scales. This equivalence in the general case requires the surplus each agent receives to be expressed in compatible, or comparable, units. This result is valid in the case of bargaining over multiple-issues. In addition, we discuss the requirements on the curvatures of the agents’ utility functions, or, in other words, on the bargainers’ attitudes towards risk.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Universidad de Málaga, Department of Economic Theory, Málaga Economic Theory Research Center in its series Working Papers with number 2010-04.
Length: 18 pages
Date of creation: Apr 2010
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Bargaining Problems; Non-Symmetric Nash Bargaining Solution; Linear Sharing;
Other versions of this item:
- Samuel Danthine & Noemí Navarro, 2013. "How to Add Apples and Pears: Non-Symmetric Nash Bargaining and the Generalized Joint Surplus," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 33(4), pages 2840-2850.
- C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
- J5 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Labor-Management Relations, Trade Unions, and Collective Bargaining
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