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Monitoring Job Search as an Instrument for Targeting Transfers

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Author Info
Robin Boadway () (Queen's University)
Katherine Cuff (Queen's University)

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Abstract

Redistribution programs are constrained because those not working may be either unable to work, voluntarily unemployed or involuntarily unemployed. The inability to distinguish among these three cases inhibits the targeting of transfers to those most in need. Enabling the government to monitor whether unemployed individuals are searching for work and accepting any offered jobs increases its ability to redistribute income. We show that these monitoring activities are complementary, and consider how a minimum wage might be a useful adjunct to monitoring contingent tax-transfer policies.

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File URL: http://www.econ.queensu.ca/working_papers/papers/qed_wp_982.pdf
File Format: application/pdf
File Function: First version 1999
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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Queen's University, Department of Economics in its series Working Papers with number 982.

Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML, plain text, BibTeX, RIS (EndNote), ReDIF
Length: 29 pages
Date of creation: Feb 1999
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:qed:wpaper:982

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Postal: Kingston, Ontario, K7L 3N6
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Web page: http://www.econ.queensu.ca/
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Related research
Keywords: Redistribution Monitoring Unemployment Targeting

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:
I38 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Welfare and Poverty - - - Government Programs; Provision and Effects of Welfare Programs
J65 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Mobility, Unemployment, and Vacancies - - - Unemployment Insurance; Severance Pay; Plant Closings
H21 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Efficiency; Optimal Taxation

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  1. Robin Boadway & Katherine Cuff & Nicolas Marceau, 2000. "Redistribution and Employment Policies with Endogenous Unemployment," Cahiers de recherche CREFE / CREFE Working Papers 121, CREFE, Université du Québec à Montréal. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  2. Bruno, VAN DER LINDEN, 2003. "Unemployment insurance and training in an equilibrium matching model with heterogeneous agents," Université catholique de Louvain, Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales (IRES) Discussion Paper 2003001, Université catholique de Louvain, Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales (IRES). [Downloadable!]
  3. Robin Boadway & Katherine Cuff, 1999. "A Minimum Wage Can Be Welfare-Improving and Employment-Enhancing," Cahiers de recherche CREFE / CREFE Working Papers 72, CREFE, Université du Québec à Montréal. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  4. E. Lehmann & B. Van Der Linden, 2004. "On the Optimality of Search Matching Equilibrium when workers are risk adverse," Working Papers ERMES 0406, ERMES, University Paris 2. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  5. Teresa L. Cyrus & Lynn Lethbridge & Lars Osberg, 2007. "The Double-Edged Sword of Trade," Eastern Economic Journal, Eastern Economic Association, vol. 33(2), pages 277-292, Spring. [Downloadable!]
  6. Robin Boadway & Katherine Cuff & Nicolas Marceau, 1999. "Inter-Jurisdictional Competition for Firms: Jobs as Vehicles for Redistribution," Cahiers de recherche CREFE / CREFE Working Papers 85, CREFE, Université du Québec à Montréal, revised Jul 1999. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
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