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Monitoring Job Search as an Instrument for Targeting Transfers

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Author Info
Robin Boadway () (Center for Research on Economic Fluctuations and Employment and Queen's University)
Katherine Cuff () (Queen's University)

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Abstract

Redistribution programs are constrained because those not working may be either unable to work, voluntarily unemployed or involuntarily unemployed. The inability to distinguish among these theree cases inhibits the targeting of transfers to those most in need. Enabling the government to monitor whether unemployed individuals are searching for work and accepting any offered jobs increases its ability to redistribute income. We show that these monitoring activities are complementary, and consider how a minimum wage might be a useful adjunct to monitoring contingent tax-transfer policies.

Les programmes de redistribution sont contraints par le fait que les sans-emploi peuvent être des individus inaptes au travail, volontairement au chômage ou involontairement au chômage. L'incapacité de distinguer parmi ces trois possibilités réduit la qualité du ciblage des transferts destinés à ceux qui en ont le plus besoin. Permettre au gouvernement de vérifier que les individus au chômage cherchent un emploi et qu'ils acceptent les offres qu'ils reçoivent accroît sa capacité à redistribuer le revenu. Nous montrons que ces activités de vérification sont complémentaires et établissons les circonstances sous lesquelles un salaire minimum peut être un ajout utile à un système dans lequel les taxes-transferts dépendent des résultats de la vérification.

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by CREFE, Université du Québec à Montréal in its series Cahiers de recherche CREFE / CREFE Working Papers with number 71.

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Length: 30 pages
Date of creation: Mar 1999
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Handle: RePEc:cre:crefwp:71

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Related research
Keywords: redistribution monitoring unemployement targeting

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:
I38 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Welfare and Poverty - - - Government Programs; Provision and Effects of Welfare Programs
J65 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Mobility, Unemployment, and Vacancies - - - Unemployment Insurance; Severance Pay; Plant Closings
H21 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Efficiency; Optimal Taxation

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References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Cremer, Helmuth & Gahvari, Firouz, 1996. "Tax evasion and the optimum general income tax," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 60(2), pages 235-249, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Shapiro, Carl & Stiglitz, Joseph E, 1984. "Equilibrium Unemployment as a Worker Discipline Device," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 74(3), pages 433-44, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Marhuenda, Francisco & Ortuno-Ortin, Ignacio, 1997. " Tax Enforcement Problems," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 99(1), pages 61-72, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Parsons, Donald O., 1996. "Imperfect 'tagging' in social insurance programs," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 62(1-2), pages 183-207, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Joseph Stiglitz, 1999. "Taxation, Public Policy, and Dynamics of Unemployment," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer, vol. 6(3), pages 239-262, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Diamond, Peter A, 1982. "Wage Determination and Efficiency in Search Equilibrium," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 49(2), pages 217-27, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Kanbur, Ravi & Keen, Michael & Tuomala, Matti, 1994. "Labor Supply and Targeting in Poverty Alleviation Programs," World Bank Economic Review, Oxford University Press, vol. 8(2), pages 191-211, May.
  8. Besley, Timothy & Coate, Stephen, 1992. "Workfare versus Welfare Incentive Arguments for Work Requirements in Poverty-Alleviation Programs," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 82(1), pages 249-61, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  9. Peter Birch Sørensen, . "Tax Policy, the Good Jobs and the Bad Jobs," EPRU Working Paper Series 98-10, Economic Policy Research Unit (EPRU), University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics.
  10. Chander, Parkash & Wilde, Louis L, 1998. "A General Characterization of Optimal Income Tax Enforcement," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 65(1), pages 165-83, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  11. Boadway, Robin & Marceau, Nicolas & Sato, Motohiro, 1999. "Agency and the design of welfare systems," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 73(1), pages 1-30, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Robin Boadway & Katherine Cuff & Nicolas Marceau, 2000. "Redistribution and Employment Policies with Endogenous Unemployment," Cahiers de recherche CREFE / CREFE Working Papers 121, CREFE, Université du Québec à Montréal. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  2. Bruno, VAN DER LINDEN, 2003. "Unemployment insurance and training in an equilibrium matching model with heterogeneous agents," Université catholique de Louvain, Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales (IRES) Discussion Paper 2003001, Université catholique de Louvain, Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales (IRES). [Downloadable!]
  3. Robin Boadway & Katherine Cuff, 1999. "A Minimum Wage Can Be Welfare-Improving and Employment-Enhancing," Cahiers de recherche CREFE / CREFE Working Papers 72, CREFE, Université du Québec à Montréal. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  4. E. Lehmann & B. Van Der Linden, 2004. "On the Optimality of Search Matching Equilibrium when workers are risk adverse," Working Papers ERMES 0406, ERMES, University Paris 2. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  5. Teresa L. Cyrus & Lynn Lethbridge & Lars Osberg, 2007. "The Double-Edged Sword of Trade," Eastern Economic Journal, Eastern Economic Association, vol. 33(2), pages 277-292, Spring. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  6. Robin Boadway & Katherine Cuff & Nicolas Marceau, 1999. "Inter-Jurisdictional Competition for Firms: Jobs as Vehicles for Redistribution," Cahiers de recherche CREFE / CREFE Working Papers 85, CREFE, Université du Québec à Montréal, revised Jul 1999. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
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