This file is part of IDEAS, which uses RePEc data


[ Papers | Articles | Software | Books | Chapters | Authors | Institutions | JEL Classification | NEP reports | Search | New papers by email | Author registration | Rankings | Volunteers | FAQ | Blog | Help! ]

Tax Enforcement Problems

Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics
Author Info
Marhuenda, Francisco
Ortuno-Ortin, Ignacio

Additional information is available for the following registered author(s):

Abstract

The authors study an income tax enforcement problem using a principal-agent model where the government sets the tax and inspection functions. These are announced to the agents and there is no commitment problem. The penalty function for dishonest taxpayers is given exogenously and satisfies certain social norms. The authors prove that, for a large family of penalty functions, this policy is such that honesty implies regressiveness. This result does not depend on the fact that agents know the true probability of inspection. Copyright 1997 by The editors of the Scandinavian Journal of Economics.

Download Info
To download:

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. Information about this may be contained in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/servlet/useragent?func=synergy&synergyAction=showTOC&journalCode=sjoe&volume=99&issue=1&year=1997&part=null
File Format: text/html
File Function: link to full text
Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.

Publisher Info
Article provided by Blackwell Publishing in its journal Scandinavian Journal of Economics.

Volume (Year): 99 (1997)
Issue (Month): 1 (March)
Pages: 61-72
Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML (with abstract), plain text (with abstract), BibTeX, RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite), ReDIF
Handle: RePEc:bla:scandj:v:99:y:1997:i:1:p:61-72

Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.blackwellpublishing.com/journal.asp?ref=0347-0520

Order Information:
Web: http://www.blackwellpublishing.com/subs.asp?ref=0347-0520

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Christopher F. Baum).

Related research
Keywords:

Other versions of this item:

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)
  1. Robin Boadway & Nicolas Marceau & Steeve Mongrain, 2000. "Tax Evasion and Trust," Cahiers de recherche CREFE / CREFE Working Papers 104, CREFE, Université du Québec à Montréal. [Downloadable!]
  2. Robin Boadway & Motohiro Sato, 2000. "The Optimality of Punishing Only the Innocent: The Case of Tax Evasion," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer, vol. 7(6), pages 641-664, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. repec:sfu:sfudps:dp00-05 is not listed on IDEAS
    Other versions:
  4. Martin Besfamille & Cecilia Parlatore Siritto, 2009. "Modernization of Tax Administrations and Optimal Fiscal Policies," Department of Economics Working Papers 2009-07, Universidad Torcuato Di Tella. [Downloadable!]
  5. Wolfram Richter & Robin Boadway, 2001. "Trading Off Tax Distortion and Tax Evasion," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo Group Munich. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  6. Robin Boadway & Katherine Cuff, 1999. "A Minimum Wage Can Be Welfare-Improving and Employment-Enhancing," Cahiers de recherche CREFE / CREFE Working Papers 72, CREFE, Université du Québec à Montréal. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  7. Sanjit Dhami & Ali al-Nowaihi, 2007. "Optimal income taxation in the presence of tax evasion: Expected utility versus prospect theory," Discussion Papers in Economics 07/10, Department of Economics, University of Leicester. [Downloadable!]
  8. Robin Boadway & Katherine Cuff, 1999. "Monitoring Job Search as an Instrument For Targeting Transfers," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer, vol. 6(3), pages 317-337, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
Statistics
Access and download statistics

Did you know? IDEAS also covers the most complete directory of Economics departments and institutes, EDIRC.

This page was last updated on 2009-11-22.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Department of Economics, College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, University of Connecticut using RePEc data on a server sponsored by the Society for Economic Dynamics.