This file is part of IDEAS, which uses RePEc data


[ Papers | Articles | Software | Books | Chapters | Authors | Institutions | JEL Classification | NEP reports | Search | New papers by email | Author registration | Rankings | Volunteers | FAQ | Blog | Help! ]

Optimal Unemployment Insurance Design:Time Limits, Monitoring, or Workfare?

Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics
Author Info
Fredriksson, Peter () (Department of Economics)
Holmlund, Bertil () (Department of Economics)

Additional information is available for the following registered author(s):

Abstract

This paper analyses crucial design features of unemployment insurance (UI) policies. We examine three different means of improving the efficiency of UI: the duration of benefit payments, monitoring in conjunction with sanctions, and workfare. To that end we develop a quantitative model of equilibrium unemployment. The model features worker heterogeneity, which takes the form of differences in preferences for leisure. All the instruments are ways of limiting the duration of UI benefit receipt and the model can be used to compare them in a coherent fashion. The analysis suggests that a system with monitoring and sanctions restores search incentives most effectively, since it brings additional incentives to search actively so as to avoid the sanction. Therefore, the UI provider can offer a more generous UI replacement rate in a system with monitoring and sanctions than in the other two systems. Workfare appears to be inferior to the other two systems.

Download Info
To download:

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. Information about this may be contained in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://www.nek.uu.se/pdf/wp2003_17.pdf
File Format: application/pdf
File Function:
Download Restriction: no

Publisher Info
Paper provided by Uppsala University, Department of Economics in its series Working Paper Series with number 2003:17.

Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML (with abstract), plain text (with abstract), BibTeX, RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite), ReDIF
Length: 25 pages
Date of creation: 25 Jun 2003
Date of revision:
Publication status: Published in International Tax and Public Finance, 2006, pages 565-585.
Handle: RePEc:hhs:uunewp:2003_017

Contact details of provider:
Postal: Department of Economics, Uppsala University, P. O. Box 513, SE-751 20 Uppsala, Sweden
Phone: + 46 18 471 25 00
Fax: + 46 18 471 14 78
Email:
Web page: http://www.nek.uu.se/
More information through EDIRC

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Katarina Grönvall).

Related research
Keywords: Unemployment insurance; search; monitoring; sanctions; workfare;

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:
J64 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Mobility, Unemployment, and Vacancies - - - Unemployment: Models, Duration, Incidence, and Job Search
J65 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Mobility, Unemployment, and Vacancies - - - Unemployment Insurance; Severance Pay; Plant Closings
J68 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Mobility, Unemployment, and Vacancies - - - Public Policy

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Boone, Jan & Fredriksson, Peter & Holmlund, Bertil & van Ours, Jan, 2002. "Optimal unemployment insurance with monitoring and sanctions," Working Paper Series 2002:21, IFAU - Institute for Labour Market Policy Evaluation. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  2. Paul Beaudry & Charles Blackorby, 1998. "Taxes and Employment Subsidies in Optimal Redistribution Programs," NBER Working Papers 6355, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  3. Boone, Jan & van Ours, Jan C., 2000. "Modeling Financial Incentives to Get Unemployed Back to Work," IZA Discussion Papers 108, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA). [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  4. Claus Thustrup Kreiner & Torben Tranæs, 2003. "Optimal Workfare with Voluntary and Involuntary Unemployment," EPRU Working Paper Series 03-15, Economic Policy Research Unit (EPRU), University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics, revised Aug 2004. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  5. Lalive, Rafael & van Ours, Jan C. & Zweimüller, Josef, 2002. "The Effect of Benefit Sanctions on the Duration of Unemployment," IZA Discussion Papers 469, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA). [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  6. Hassler, John & Rodríguez Mora, José V., 2002. "Should UI Benefits Really Fall Over Time?," IZA Discussion Papers 622, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA). [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  7. Dale T. Mortensen, 1977. "Unemployment insurance and job search decisions," Industrial and Labor Relations Review, ILR Review, ILR School, Cornell University, vol. 30(4), pages 505-517, July.
  8. Fredriksson, Peter & Holmlund, Bertil, 2003. "Improving Incentives in Unemployment Insurance: A Review of Recent Research," Working Paper Series 2003:10, Uppsala University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  9. Jaap H. Abbring & Gerard J. Berg & Jan C. Ours, 2005. "The Effect of Unemployment Insurance Sanctions on the Transition Rate from Unemployment to Employment," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 115(505), pages 602-630, 07. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  10. Gerard van den Berg & Bas van der Klaauw, 2000. "Counseling and Monitoring of Unemployed Workers: Theory and Evidence from a Social Experiment," Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers 0972, Econometric Society. [Downloadable!]
  11. Davidson, Carl & Woodbury, Stephen A., 1997. "Optimal unemployment insurance," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 64(3), pages 359-387, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  12. Gerard J. van den Berg & Bas van der Klaauw & Jan C. van Ours, 2004. "Punitive Sanctions and the Transition Rate from Welfare to Work," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 22(1), pages 211-210, January. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  13. Fredriksson, Peter & Holmlund, Bertil, 2001. "Optimal Unemployment Insurance in Search Equilibrium," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 19(2), pages 370-99, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  14. Hosios, Arthur J, 1990. "On the Efficiency of Matching and Related Models of Search and Unemployment," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 57(2), pages 279-98, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  15. Claus T. Hansen & Torben Tranaes, 2000. "Optimal Workfare in a Society of Workers and Non-Workers," Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers 0758, Econometric Society. [Downloadable!]
  16. Besley, T. & Coate, S., 1991. "The Design Of Income Maintenance Programs," Papers 74, Princeton, Woodrow Wilson School - John M. Olin Program.
    Other versions:
  17. Dan A. Black & Jeffrey A. Smith & Mark C. Berger & Brett J. Noel, 2003. "Is the Threat of Reemployment Services More Effective Than the Services Themselves? Evidence from Random Assignment in the UI System," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 93(4), pages 1313-1327, September. [Downloadable!]
  18. Cahuc, Pierre & Lehmann, Etienne, 2000. "Should unemployment benefits decrease with the unemployment spell?," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 77(1), pages 135-153, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  19. Shavell, Steven & Weiss, Laurence, 1979. "The Optimal Payment of Unemployment Insurance Benefits over Time," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 87(6), pages 1347-62, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  20. Hopenhayn, Hugo A & Nicolini, Juan Pablo, 1997. "Optimal Unemployment Insurance," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 105(2), pages 412-38, April.
    Other versions:
  21. Oliver Jean Blanchard & Peter Diamond, 1989. "The Beveridge Curve," Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Economic Studies Program, The Brookings Institution, vol. 20(1989-1), pages 1-76. [Downloadable!]
  22. Wang, Cheng & Williamson, Stephen, 1996. "Unemployment insurance with moral hazard in a dynamic economy," Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy, Elsevier, vol. 44(1), pages 1-41, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
Full references

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Michael Svarer, 2007. "The Effect of Sanctions on the Job Finding Rate: Evidence from Denmark," Economics Working Papers 2007-10, School of Economics and Management, University of Aarhus. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  2. Cockx, Bart & Ries, Jean, 2004. "The Exhaustion of Unemployment Benefits in Belgium: Does it Enhance the Probability of Employment?," IZA Discussion Papers 1177, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA). [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  3. Hägglund, Pathric, 2006. "Are there pre-programme effects of Swedish active labour market policies? Evidence from three randomised experiments," Working Paper Series 2006:2, IFAU - Institute for Labour Market Policy Evaluation. [Downloadable!]
  4. Gabriele, CARDULLO & Bruno, VANDERLINDEN, 2006. "Employment subsidies and substitutable skills : An equilibrium matching approach," Discussion Papers (ECON - Département des Sciences Economiques) 2006010, Université catholique de Louvain, Département des Sciences Economiques. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  5. Torben M. Andersen & Michael Svarer, 2008. "The role of workfare in striking a balance between incentives and insurance in the labour market," Economics Working Papers 2008-05, School of Economics and Management, University of Aarhus. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  6. Fredriksson, Peter & Holmlund, Bertil, 2003. "Improving incentives in unemployment insurance: A review of recent research," Working Paper Series 2003:5, IFAU - Institute for Labour Market Policy Evaluation. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  7. Koch, Susanne & Stephan, Gesine & Walwei, Ulrich, 2005. "Workfare: Möglichkeiten und Grenzen," IAB Discussion Paper 200517, Institut für Arbeitsmarkt- und Berufsforschung (IAB), Nürnberg [Institute for Employment Research, Nuremberg, Germany]. [Downloadable!]
  8. Blomquist, Sören & Christiansen, Vidar, 2004. "Taxation and Heterogeneous Preferences," Working Paper Series 2004:9, Uppsala University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  9. Koch, Susanne & Stephan, Gesine & Walwei, Ulrich, 2005. "Workfare: Möglichkeiten und Grenzen (Workfare : possibilities and limits)," Zeitschrift für ArbeitsmarktForschung - Journal for Labour Market Research, Institut für Arbeitsmarkt- und Berufsforschung (IAB), Nürnberg [Institute for Employment Research, Nuremberg, Germany], vol. 38(2/3), pages 419-440. [Downloadable!]
  10. Aronsson, Thomas & Blomquist, Sören, 2004. "Redistribution and Provision of Public Goods in an Economic Federation," Working Paper Series 2004:4, Uppsala University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  11. Torben M. Andersen & Michael Svarer, 2007. "Flexicurity – labour market performance in Denmark," Economics Working Papers 2007-09, School of Economics and Management, University of Aarhus. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  12. Wolfgang Ochel, 2004. "Welfare-to-Work Experiences with Specific Work-First Programmes in Selected Countries," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo Group Munich. [Downloadable!]
  13. Christian Holzner & Volker Meier & Martin Werding, 2006. "Workfare, Monitoring, and Efficiency Wages," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo Group Munich. [Downloadable!]
  14. Volker Meier, 2008. "Workfare in an efficiency wage model," Empirica, Springer, vol. 35(2), pages 165-178, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
Statistics
Access and download statistics

Did you know? You can import bibliographic info in various formats into you bibliographic tool, or just into your word processor. See under "publisher info" on each abstract page.

This page was last updated on 2009-11-18.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Department of Economics, College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, University of Connecticut using RePEc data on a server sponsored by the Society for Economic Dynamics.