Modeling Financial Incentives to Get the Unemployed Back to Work
AbstractWe model how unemployment benefit sanctions - benefit reductions that are imposed if unemployed do not comply with job search guidelines - affect unemployment. We find that benefit sanctions are more effective in reducing unemployment than an across-the-board reduction in the replacement rate, for a given loss in welfare for the unemployed. We decompose the effects of a sanction system into micro, crowding-out, spillover, and tax effects.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen in its journal Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics.
Volume (Year): 162 (2006)
Issue (Month): 2 (June)
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Find related papers by JEL classification:
- H55 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - Social Security and Public Pensions
- J65 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Mobility, Unemployment, Vacancies, and Immigrant Workers - - - Unemployment Insurance; Severance Pay; Plant Closings
- J68 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Mobility, Unemployment, Vacancies, and Immigrant Workers - - - Public Policy
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