Optimal Taxation of Top Labor Incomes: A Tale of Three Elasticities
AbstractThis paper analyzes the problem of optimal taxation of top labour incomes. We develop a model where top incomes respond to marginal tax rates through three channels: (1) the standard supply-side channel through reduced economic activity, (2) the tax avoidance channel, (3) the compensation bargaining channel through efforts in influencing own pay setting. We derive the optimal top tax rate formula as a function of the three elasticities corresponding to those three channels of responses. The first elasticity (supply side) is the sole real factor limiting optimal top tax rates. The optimal tax system should be designed to minimize the second elasticity (avoidance) through tax enforcement and tax neutrality across income forms, in which case the second elasticity becomes irrelevant. The optimal top tax rate increases with the third elasticity (bargaining) as bargaining efforts are zero-sum in aggregate. We then analyze top income and top tax rate data in 18 OECD countries. There is a strong correlation between cuts in top tax rates and increases in top 1% income shares since 1975, implying that the overall elasticity is large. But top income share increases have not translated into higher economic growth, consistent with the zero-sum bargaining model. This suggests that the first elasticity is modest in size and that the overall effect comes mostly from the third elasticity. Consequently, socially optimal top tax rates might possibly be much higher than what is commonly assumed.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers in its series CEPR Discussion Papers with number 8675.
Date of creation: Nov 2011
Date of revision:
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Other versions of this item:
- Thomas Piketty & Emmanuel Saez & Stefanie Stantcheva, 2014. "Optimal Taxation of Top Labor Incomes: A Tale of Three Elasticities," American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, American Economic Association, vol. 6(1), pages 230-71, February.
- Thomas Piketty & Emmanuel Saez & Stefanie Stantcheva, 2011. "Optimal Taxation of Top Labor Incomes: A Tale of Three Elasticities," NBER Working Papers 17616, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Stefanie Stantcheva & Emmanuel Saez & Thomas Piketty, 2012. "Optimal Taxation of Top Labor Incomes: A Tale of Three Elasticities," 2012 Meeting Papers 78, Society for Economic Dynamics.
- H21 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Efficiency; Optimal Taxation
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ACC-2011-12-13 (Accounting & Auditing)
- NEP-ALL-2011-12-13 (All new papers)
- NEP-PUB-2011-12-13 (Public Finance)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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Blog mentionsAs found by EconAcademics.org, the blog aggregator for Economics research:
- Taxes & growth
by chris dillow in Stumbling and Mumbling on 2014-01-27 14:49:16
- Inequality: a missing perspective
by chris dillow in Stumbling and Mumbling on 2014-04-24 13:28:09
- Given the enormity of the short- and long-run fiscal challenges facing the US, the lack of policy detail from both presidential candidates is disappointing
by Blog Admin in British Politics and Policy at LSE on 2012-10-25 13:00:36
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