The Dating Game: Do Managers Designate Option Grant Dates to Increase their Compensation?
AbstractWe provide evidence of two variants of a dating game that entails picking a grant date ex post, that is, after the board's compensation decision is made: back-dating (picking a date before the board decision date), and forward-dating (waiting after the board decision date to observe the stock price behavior). Consistent with back-dating, we find stock return behavior around the grant date to be positively related to reporting lag. In the promptly reported sample, we find stock return behavior and the pattern of reporting lags consistent with forward-dating. Our calculations show that managers can obtain economically significant benefits by playing the dating game. , Oxford University Press.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Society for Financial Studies in its journal The Review of Financial Studies.
Volume (Year): 21 (2008)
Issue (Month): 5 (September)
Contact details of provider:
Postal: Oxford University Press, Journals Department, 2001 Evans Road, Cary, NC 27513 USA.
Web page: http://www.rfs.oupjournals.org/
More information through EDIRC
You can help add them by filling out this form.
CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Oscar Mitnik & Qiang Kang, 2008.
"Not So Lucky Any More: CEO Compensation in Financially Distressed Firms,"
0906, University of Miami, Department of Economics.
- Kang, Qiang & Mitnik, Oscar A., 2008. "Not So Lucky Any More: CEO Compensation in Financially Distressed Firms," IZA Discussion Papers 3857, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
- Compton, Ryan & Sandler, Daniel & Tedds, Lindsay M., 2010. "Backdating, tax evasion, and the unintended consequences of Canadian tax reform," MPRA Paper 39788, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Ertimur, Yonca & Ferri, Fabrizio & Maber, David A., 2012. "Reputation penalties for poor monitoring of executive pay: Evidence from option backdating," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 104(1), pages 118-144.
- van der Goot, Tjalling, 2010. "Is it timing or backdating of option grants?," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 30(3), pages 209-217, September.
- Kang, Qiang & Liu, Qiao & Qi, Rong, 2010. "The Sarbanes-Oxley act and corporate investment: A structural assessment," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 96(2), pages 291-305, May.
- Eikseth, Hans Marius & Lindset, Snorre, 2011. "Backdating executive stock options--An ex ante valuation," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 35(10), pages 1731-1743, October.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Oxford University Press) or (Christopher F. Baum).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.