Is the Optimal Labor Income Tax Progressive in a Unionized Economy?
Abstract
This paper concerns optimal nonlinear labor income taxation in an economy with union wage setting and endogenous hours of work. The purpose is to study the determinants of tax progression. We show that the optimal degree of progression of the labor income tax depends on the extent to which the government can influence the wage rate via tax policy as well as on its ability to redistribute income across individuals. In addition, the argument for progressive labor income taxation depends on whether hours of work are chosen by the employed themselves or the union. Copyright The editors of the "Scandinavian Journal of Economics", 2004 .Download Info
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Bibliographic Info
Article provided by Wiley Blackwell in its journal The Scandinavian Journal of Economics.
Volume (Year): 106 (2004)
Issue (Month): 4 (December)
Pages: 661-675
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Web page: http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/journal/10.1111/(ISSN)1467-9442
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Related research
Keywords:Other versions of this item:
- Aronsson, Thomas & Sjögren, Tomas, 2002. "Is the Optimal Labor Income Tax Progressive in a Unionized Economy?," UmeÃ¥ Economic Studies 587, Umeå University, Department of Economics.
- H21 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Efficiency; Optimal Taxation
- J22 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demand and Supply of Labor - - - Time Allocation and Labor Supply
- J51 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Labor-Management Relations, Trade Unions, and Collective Bargaining - - - Trade Unions: Objectives, Structure, and Effects
References
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- Hersoug, Tor, 1984. "Union Wage Responses to Tax Changes," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 36(1), pages 37-51, March.
Citations
Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.Cited by:
- Aronsson, Thomas, 2007. "General Income Taxation, Public Goods and Decentralized Leadership," UmeÃ¥ Economic Studies 715, Umeå University, Department of Economics.
- Aronsson, Thomas & Sjögren, Tomas, 2006. "Optimal Income Taxation and Social Norms in the Labor Market," UmeÃ¥ Economic Studies 672, Umeå University, Department of Economics.
- Aronsson, Thomas & Koskela, Erkki, 2008. "Optimal Redistributive Taxation and Provision of Public Input Goods in an Economy with Outsourcing and Unemployment," UmeÃ¥ Economic Studies 759, Umeå University, Department of Economics.
- Aronsson, Thomas, 2010. "Optimal income taxation and decentralized fiscal federalism," Regional Science and Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 40(4), pages 187-195, July.
- Aronsson, Thomas & Wikström, Magnus, 2011. "Optimal Tax Progression: Does it Matter if Wage Bargaining is Centralized or Decentralized?," UmeÃ¥ Economic Studies 829, Umeå University, Department of Economics.
- Aronsson, Thomas & Sjögren, Tomas, 2005. "Externalities, Border Trade and Illegal Production: An Optimal Tax Approach to Alcohol Policy," UmeÃ¥ Economic Studies 654, Umeå University, Department of Economics.
- Thomas Aronsson & James R. Walker, 2010. "Labor Supply, Tax Base and Public Policy in Sweden," NBER Chapters, in: Reforming the Welfare State: Recovery and Beyond in Sweden, pages 127-158 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Thomas Aronsson Aronsson & Thomas Jonsson & Tomas Sjögren, 2006.
"Environmental Policy and Optimal Taxation in a Decentralized Economic Federation,"
FinanzArchiv: Public Finance Analysis,
Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 62(3), pages 437-454, September.
- Aronsson, Thomas & Jonsson, Thomas & Sjögren, Tomas, 2006. "Environmental Policy and Optimal Taxation in a Decentralized Economic Federation," UmeÃ¥ Economic Studies 669, Umeå University, Department of Economics.
- Aronsson, Thomas & Persson, Lars & Sjögren, Tomas, 2006. "Optimal Taxation and Transboundary Externalities - Are Endogenous World Market Prices Important?," UmeÃ¥ Economic Studies 699, Umeå University, Department of Economics.
- Aronsson, Thomas & Wehke, Sven, 2006.
"Public Goods, Unemployment and Policy Coordination,"
Umeå Economic Studies
700, Umeå University, Department of Economics.
- Aronsson, Thomas & Wehke, Sven, 2008. "Public goods, unemployment and policy coordination," Regional Science and Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 38(3), pages 285-298, May.
- Thomas Aronsson & Tomas Sjögren & Torbjörn Dalin, 2009. "Optimal taxation and redistribution in an OLG model with unemployment," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer, vol. 16(2), pages 198-218, April.
- Aronsson, Thomas & Löfgren, Karl-Gustaf, 2007. "Welfare Theory: History and Modern Results," UmeÃ¥ Economic Studies 726, Umeå University, Department of Economics.
- Thomas Aronsson & Erkki Koskela, 2008. "Optimal Redistributive Taxation and Provision of Public Input Goods in an Economy with Outsourcing and Unemployment," CESifo Working Paper Series 2481, CESifo Group Munich.
- Aronsson, Thomas & Koskela, Erkki, 2009. "Optimal Redistributive Taxation and Provision of Public Input Goods in an Economy with Outsourcing and Unemployment," IZA Discussion Papers 4196, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
- Thomas Aronsson, 2005. "Environmental Policy, Efficient Taxation and Unemployment," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer, vol. 12(2), pages 131-144, March.
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