This file is part of IDEAS, which uses RePEc data


[ Papers | Articles | Software | Books | Chapters | Authors | Institutions | JEL Classification | NEP reports | Search | New papers by email | Author registration | Rankings | Volunteers | FAQ | Blog | Help! ]

The Single-Mindedness of Labor Unions: Theory and Empirical Evidence

Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics
Author Info
Canegrati, Emanuele

Additional information is available for the following registered author(s):

Abstract

In this paper I analyse a labour market where the wage is endogenously determined according to an Efficient Bargaining process between a firm and a labour union whose members are partitioned into two social groups: the old and the young. Furthermore, I exploit the Single-Mindedness theory, which considers the existence of a density function which endogenously depends on leisure. I demonstrate that, when preferences of one group for leisure are higher than those of the other group the latter suffers from higher tax rates and with lower level of wage rates and lower levels of leisure. Finally, since the former is more single-minded, it may exploit its greater political power in order to get a positive intergenerational transfer. Empirical evidence from the WERS 2004 survey confirms main results of the model.

Download Info
To download:

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. Information about this may be contained in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help file. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/1398/
File Format:
File Function:
Download Restriction: no

Publisher Info
Paper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number 1398.

Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML, plain text, BibTeX, RIS (EndNote), ReDIF
Length:
Date of creation: Jan 2007
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:1398

Contact details of provider:
Postal: Schackstr. 4, D-80539 Munich, Germany
Phone: +49-(0)89-2180-2219
Fax: +49-(0)89-2180-3900
Web page: http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de
More information through EDIRC

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Ekkehart Schlicht).

Related research
Keywords: bargaining models labour unions political economy single-mindedness

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:
J51 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Labor-Management Relations, Trade Unions, and Collective Bargaining - - - Trade Unions: Objectives, Structure, and Effects
J50 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Labor-Management Relations, Trade Unions, and Collective Bargaining - - - General
J52 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Labor-Management Relations, Trade Unions, and Collective Bargaining - - - Dispute Resolution: Strikes, Arbitration, and Mediation
J38 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs - - - Public Policy
J22 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demand and Supply of Labor - - - Time Allocation and Labor Supply
J58 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Labor-Management Relations, Trade Unions, and Collective Bargaining - - - Public Policy
D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
J21 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demand and Supply of Labor - - - Labor Force and Employment, Size, and Structure
J26 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demand and Supply of Labor - - - Retirement; Retirement Policies
J20 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demand and Supply of Labor - - - General

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Earle, John S & Pencavel, John, 1990. "Hours of Work and Trade Unionism," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 8(1), pages S150-74, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Casey B Mulligan, 1999. "Gerontocracy, Retirement, and Social Security," University of Chicago - George G. Stigler Center for Study of Economy and State 154, Chicago - Center for Study of Economy and State. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  3. Koskela, Erkki & Vilmunen, Jouko, 1996. "Tax progression is good for employment in popular models of trade union behaviour," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 3(1), pages 65-80, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Hersoug, Tor, 1984. "Union Wage Responses to Tax Changes," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 36(1), pages 37-51, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Edwards, Jeremy & Keen, Michael, 1996. "Tax competition and Leviathan," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 40(1), pages 113-134, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  6. Hinich, Melvin J., 1977. "Equilibrium in spatial voting: The median voter result is an artifact," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 16(2), pages 208-219, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  7. Koskela, Erkki & Schob, Ronnie, 2002. " Optimal Factor Income Taxation in the Presence of Unemployment," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 4(3), pages 387-404. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  8. Casey B. Mulligan & Xavier Sala-i-Martin, 2003. "Social Security, Retirement, and the Single-Mindedness of the Electorate," NBER Working Papers 9691, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  9. Lindbeck, Assar & Snower, Dennis, 2002. "The Insider-Outsider Theory: A Survey," IZA Discussion Papers 534, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA). [Downloadable!]
  10. Clemens Fuest & Bernd Huber, . "Tax Coordination and Unemployment," EPRU Working Paper Series 97-26, Economic Policy Research Unit (EPRU), University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics.
    Other versions:
  11. McDonald, Ian M & Suen, Anthony, 1992. "On the Measurement and Determination of Trade Union Power," Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics, Department of Economics, University of Oxford, vol. 54(2), pages 209-24, May.
  12. Manning, Alan, 1987. "An Integration of Trade Union Models in a Sequential Bargaining Framework," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 97(385), pages 121-39, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  13. McDonald, Ian M & Solow, Robert M, 1981. "Wage Bargaining and Employment," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 71(5), pages 896-908, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  14. Alex Bryson & Rafael Gomez, 2003. "Why Have Workers Stopped Joining Unions?," CEP Discussion Papers dp0589, Centre for Economic Performance, LSE. [Downloadable!]
  15. Erkki Koskela & Ronnie Schoeb, 2002. "Optimal Capital Taxation in Economies with Unionised and Competitive Labour Markets," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo GmbH. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  16. Paola Profeta, 2002. "Retirement and Social Security in a Probabilistic Voting Model," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer, vol. 9(4), pages 331-348, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Full references

Statistics
Access and download statistics

Did you know? A few items listed on IDEAS are over 2000 years old!

This page was last updated on 2008-8-28.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Department of Economics, College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, University of Connecticut using RePEc data on a server sponsored by the Society for Economic Dynamics.