In this paper I will introduce a new political economy model, where there exists a competition amongst two political candidates, which aim to set a policy which enables them to win elections, max- imising the probability of winning. I will show that, if taxes neces- sary to repay the debt are not lump sum but proportional to income, we have dramatic distorting effect on the labour supply. The prob- lem is exacerbate once we take into account that the Government set taxes in order to favour the most in‡uencing social group. As a consequence, effective marginal tax rates are differentiated amongst social groups and thus the burden of public debt is not equally borne.
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Paper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number
2254.
Find related papers by JEL classification: J20 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demand and Supply of Labor - - - General H63 - Public Economics - - National Budget, Deficit, and Debt - - - Debt; Debt Management D31 - Microeconomics - - Distribution - - - Personal Income and Wealth Distribution J26 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demand and Supply of Labor - - - Retirement; Retirement Policies H21 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Efficiency; Optimal Taxation H55 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - Social Security and Public Pensions D78 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Positive Analysis of Policy-Making and Implementation J18 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demographic Economics - - - Public Policy D63 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement J22 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demand and Supply of Labor - - - Time Allocation and Labor Supply H11 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - Structure and Scope of Government J14 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demographic Economics - - - Economics of the Elderly; Economics of the Handicapped D64 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Altruism H60 - Public Economics - - National Budget, Deficit, and Debt - - - General D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Models of Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior H23 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Externalities; Redistributive Effects; Environmental Taxes and Subsidies
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