In this paper I will analyse the redistribution of income amongst n generations using the Single-mindedness Theory. I will introduce a new expression for the balanced-budget constraint, no longer based on lump- sum transfers as in the traditional literature, but rather on more realistic labour income taxation. Since the Government has to clear the budget, some generations obtain a benefit, whilst some other must pay the entire cost of social secutiry systems. I will demonstrate that generations which are more single-minded on leisure are the most better off since they are more able to capture politicians in the political competition. Further- more, it could be the case that candidates are not forced to undertake the same policies in equilibrium and I will demonstrate that this result holds only once an endogenous density function for individual preferences for politicians is considered.
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Paper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number
2548.
Find related papers by JEL classification: H50 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - General D63 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement H61 - Public Economics - - National Budget, Deficit, and Debt - - - Budget; Budget Systems D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Models of Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior I38 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Welfare and Poverty - - - Government Programs; Provision and Effects of Welfare Programs H11 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - Structure and Scope of Government H55 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - Social Security and Public Pensions D31 - Microeconomics - - Distribution - - - Personal Income and Wealth Distribution H24 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Personal Income and Other Nonbusiness Taxes and Subsidies J13 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demographic Economics - - - Fertility; Family Planning; Child Care; Children; Youth D11 - Microeconomics - - Household Behavior - - - Consumer Economics: Theory D30 - Microeconomics - - Distribution - - - General C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games H53 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - Government Expenditures and Welfare Programs H23 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Externalities; Redistributive Effects; Environmental Taxes and Subsidies J26 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demand and Supply of Labor - - - Retirement; Retirement Policies D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations H31 - Public Economics - - Fiscal Policies and Behavior of Economic Agents - - - Household J2 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demand and Supply of Labor H60 - Public Economics - - National Budget, Deficit, and Debt - - - General J22 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demand and Supply of Labor - - - Time Allocation and Labor Supply D74 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances
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