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The Insider-Outsider Theory: A Survey

Author

Listed:
  • Lindbeck, Assar

    (Stockholm University)

  • Snower, Dennis J.

    (Hertie School of Governance)

Abstract

This article is an idiosyncratic survey of the insider-outsider theory, describing the vision underlying the theory, and evaluating salient contributions to the literature in the light of this vision. We also indicate what appear to have been dead-ends and red herrings in past research. The first section deals with the theory, concerning how labor turnover costs influence insider wages and outsiders’ opportunities and how these costs affect employment and unemployment. We also address the more complex, and open, question of how employment and unemployment move through time, in response to labor market shocks. The second section deals with the insider-outsider theory in relation to two important economic institutions: unions and social norms. The third section confronts the relevant empirical evidence. Finally, the last section concludes by clarifying some common misunderstandings and identifying promising areas of future research.

Suggested Citation

  • Lindbeck, Assar & Snower, Dennis J., 2002. "The Insider-Outsider Theory: A Survey," IZA Discussion Papers 534, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
  • Handle: RePEc:iza:izadps:dp534
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    19. Lindbeck, Assar & Snower, Dennis J, 1990. "Cooperation, Harassment, and Involuntary Unemployment: Reply," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 80(3), pages 631-636, June.
    20. Turnbull, Peter J, 1988. "Industrial Relations and the Seniority Model of Union Behaviour," Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics, Department of Economics, University of Oxford, vol. 50(1), pages 53-70, February.
    21. Mulvey, Gail C, 1997. "Can Insider-Outsider Theories Explain the Persistence of Unemployment? An Econometric Study of Two British Industries," The Manchester School of Economic & Social Studies, University of Manchester, vol. 65(2), pages 170-191, March.
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

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    2. Vesna Stavrevska, 2011. "The efficiency wages perspective to wage rigidity in the open economy: a survey," International Journal of Manpower, Emerald Group Publishing Limited, vol. 32(3), pages 273-299, June.
    3. Horst Feldmann, 2008. "Business regulation and labor market performance around the world," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 33(2), pages 201-235, April.
    4. Canegrati, Emanuele, 2007. "The Single-Mindedness of Labor Unions: Theory and Empirical Evidence," MPRA Paper 1398, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    5. Bernd Hayo & Hans Peter Gruner & Carsten Hefeker, 2004. "Monetary policy uncertainty and unionized labour markets," Money Macro and Finance (MMF) Research Group Conference 2003 42, Money Macro and Finance Research Group.
    6. Anabela Carneiro & Pedro Portugal, 2004. "Market Power, Dismissal Threat, and Rent Sharing: the Role of Insider and Outsider Forces in Wage Bargaining," CEF.UP Working Papers 0403, Universidade do Porto, Faculdade de Economia do Porto.
    7. Norbert Berthold & Rainer Fehn, 2003. "Unemployment in Germany: Reasons and Remedies," CESifo Working Paper Series 871, CESifo.
    8. canegrati, emanuele, 2007. "The single-mindedness of labor unions when transfers are not Lump-Sum," MPRA Paper 2320, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    9. Frederick Van der Ploeg, 2003. "Do Social Policies Harm Employment and Growth?," CESifo Working Paper Series 886, CESifo.
    10. Nannestad, Peter, 2009. "Unproductive immigrants: A socially optimal policy for rational egalitarians," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 25(4), pages 562-566, December.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    employment; unemployment; wages; insiders; outsiders; unemployment persistence; social exclusion; labor turnover costs;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • J23 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demand and Supply of Labor - - - Labor Demand
    • J24 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demand and Supply of Labor - - - Human Capital; Skills; Occupational Choice; Labor Productivity
    • J31 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs - - - Wage Level and Structure; Wage Differentials
    • J32 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs - - - Nonwage Labor Costs and Benefits; Retirement Plans; Private Pensions
    • J38 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs - - - Public Policy
    • J41 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Particular Labor Markets - - - Labor Contracts
    • J42 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Particular Labor Markets - - - Monopsony; Segmented Labor Markets
    • J51 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Labor-Management Relations, Trade Unions, and Collective Bargaining - - - Trade Unions: Objectives, Structure, and Effects
    • J63 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Mobility, Unemployment, Vacancies, and Immigrant Workers - - - Turnover; Vacancies; Layoffs
    • J64 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Mobility, Unemployment, Vacancies, and Immigrant Workers - - - Unemployment: Models, Duration, Incidence, and Job Search
    • J68 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Mobility, Unemployment, Vacancies, and Immigrant Workers - - - Public Policy

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