Insiders and Outsiders in Union
AbstractThis paper examines the importance of distinguishing between 'insiders' and 'outsiders' in models of union-firm bargaining. In general, insiders are those workers already established in the firm, while outsiders are either unemployed or working in temporary, low-security jobs. Modifying traditional union models to take account of this distinction is straightforward in one-period models, where the union is assumed to be indifferent to the welfare of outsiders, but is much more complicated in dynamic models. Some of the predictions of insider-outsider models concerning wage rigidity and unemployment are not robust. However, the prediction that wages will depend on both insider and outsider forces is robust and appears to be supported by the empirical evidence. Furthermore, evidence from the U.S. suggests that insider power should not be viewed as a purely union phenomenon. Copyright 1995 by Blackwell Publishers Ltd
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Wiley Blackwell in its journal Journal of Economic Surveys.
Volume (Year): 9 (1995)
Issue (Month): 3 ()
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Web page: http://www.blackwellpublishing.com/journal.asp?ref=0950-0804
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- De Paola, Maria & Scoppa, Vincenzo, 2003. "Family ties and training provision in an insider-outsider framework," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 32(2), pages 197-217, May.
- Goerke, Laszlo, 2006.
"Earnings-Related Severance Pay,"
IZA Discussion Papers
2232, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
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