In an efficiency wage economy, lump-sum severance pay from which shirkers can be excluded raises employment. However, severance payments are usually related to wages. It is shown that earnings-related, mandated severance pay will have ambiguous employment effects if effort can be varied continuously. A substitution of the earnings-related for the lump-sum component reduces employment. Thus, the prevalent form of severance payments in OECD countries might have less advantageous employment effects than previously conjectured. Copyright 2006 The Author; Journal compilation 2006 CEIS, Fondazione Giacomo Brodolini and Blackwell Publishing Ltd..
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Article provided by CEIS, Fondazione Giacomo Brodolini and Blackwell Publishing Ltd in its journal LABOUR.
Volume (Year): 20 (2006) Issue (Month): 4 (December) Pages: 651-672 Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML
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References listed on IDEAS Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
Michele Belot & Jan Boone & Jan Van Ours, 2007.
"Welfare-Improving Employment Protection,"
Economica,
London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 74(295), pages 381-396, 08.
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