The Case for a Progressive Tax: From Basic Research to Policy Recommendations
Abstract
This paper presents the case for tax progressivity based on recent results in optimal tax theory. We consider the optimal progressivity of earnings taxation and whether capital income should be taxed. We critically discuss the academic research on these topics and when and how the results can be used for policy recommendations. We argue that a result from basic research is relevant for policy only if 1) it is based on economic mechanisms that are empirically relevant and first order to the problem, 2) it is reasonably robust to changes in the modeling assumptions, and 3) the policy prescription is implementable (i.e, is socially acceptable and not too complex). We obtain three policy recommendations from basic research that satisfy these criteria reasonably well. First, very high earners should be subject to high and rising marginal tax rates on earnings. Second, low-income families should be encouraged to work with earnings subsidies, which should then be phased-out with high implicit marginal tax rates. Third, capital income should be taxed. We explain why the famous zero marginal tax rate result for the top earner in the Mirrlees model and the zero capital income tax rate results of Chamley and Judd, and Atkinson and Stiglitz are not policy relevant in our view.Download Info
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.Bibliographic Info
Article provided by American Economic Association in its journal Journal of Economic Perspectives.
Volume (Year): 25 (2011)
Issue (Month): 4 (Fall)
Pages: 165-90
Note: DOI: 10.1257/jep.25.4.165
Contact details of provider:
Email:
Web page: http://www.aeaweb.org/jep/
More information through EDIRC
Order Information:
Web: http://www.aeaweb.org/subscribe.html
Related research
Keywords:Other versions of this item:
- Peter A. Diamond & Emmanuel Saez, 2011. "The Case for a Progressive Tax: From Basic Research to Policy Recommendations," CESifo Working Paper Series 3548, CESifo Group Munich.
- H21 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Efficiency; Optimal Taxation
- H24 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Personal Income and Other Nonbusiness Taxes and Subsidies
- H25 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Business Taxes and Subsidies
References
References listed on IDEASPlease report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Mikhail Golosov & Aleh Tsyvinski, 2004.
"Designing Optimal Disability Insurance: A Case for Asset Testing,"
NBER Working Papers
10792, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Mikhail Golosov & Aleh Tsyvinski, 2006. "Designing Optimal Disability Insurance: A Case for Asset Testing," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 114(2), pages 257-279, April.
- Mikhail Golosov & Aleh Tsyvinski, 2005. "Designing Optimal Disability Insurance: A Case for Asset Testing," Levine's Bibliography 784828000000000450, UCLA Department of Economics.
- Jeffrey Brown, 2012. "Tax Policy and the Economy, Volume 26," NBER Books, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc, number brow11-2, April.
- Laroque, Guy R., 2005.
"Indirect taxation is superfluous under separability and taste homogeneity: a simple proof,"
Economics Letters,
Elsevier, vol. 87(1), pages 141-144, April.
- Guy Laroque, 2004. "Indirect Taxation is Superfluous under Separability and Taste Homogeneity : A Simple Proof," Working Papers 2004-23, Centre de Recherche en Economie et Statistique.
- Mikhail Golosov & Narayana Kocherlakota & Aleh Tsyvinski, 2002.
"Optimal Indirect and Capital Taxation,"
NajEcon Working Paper Reviews
391749000000000449, www.najecon.org.
- Mikhail Golosov & Narayana Kocherlakota & Aleh Tsyvinski, 2003. "Optimal Indirect and Capital Taxation," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 70(3), pages 569-587, 07.
- Mikhail Golosov & Narayana Kocherlakota & Aleh Tsyvinski, 2001. "Optimal indirect and capital taxation," Staff Report 293, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis.
- Mikhail Golosov & Narayana Kocherlakota & Aleh Tsyvinski, 2002. "Optimal Indirect and Capital Taxation," Levine's Working Paper Archive 391749000000000449, David K. Levine.
- Mikhail Golosov & Narayana R. Kocherlakota & Aleh Tsyvinski, 2001. "Optimal indirect and capital taxation," Working Papers 615, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis.
- Sadka, Efraim, 1976. "On Income Distribution, Incentive Effects and Optimal Income Taxation," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 43(2), pages 261-67, June.
- N. Gregory Mankiw & Matthew Weinzierl, 2010.
"The Optimal Taxation of Height: A Case Study of Utilitarian Income Redistribution,"
American Economic Journal: Economic Policy,
American Economic Association, vol. 2(1), pages 155-76, February.
- N. Gregory Mankiw & Matthew Weinzierl, 2009. "The Optimal Taxation of Height: A Case Study of Utilitarian Income Redistribution," NBER Working Papers 14976, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- N. Gregory Mankiw & Matthew C. Weinzierl, 2009. "The Optimal Taxation of Height: A Case Study of Utilitarian Income Redistribution," Harvard Business School Working Papers 09-139, Harvard Business School.
- Narayana R. Kocherlakota, 2005.
"Zero Expected Wealth Taxes: A Mirrlees Approach to Dynamic Optimal Taxation,"
Econometrica,
Econometric Society, vol. 73(5), pages 1587-1621, 09.
- Narayana R. Kocherlakota, 2003. "Zero Expected Wealth Taxes: A Mirrlees Approach to Dynamic Optimal Taxation," Levine's Bibliography 666156000000000426, UCLA Department of Economics.
- Narayana Kocherlakota, 2004. "Zero Expected Wealth Taxes: A Mirrlees Approach to Dynamic Optimal Taxation," Levine's Bibliography 122247000000000729, UCLA Department of Economics.
- Bentzel, Ragnar, 1986. " Payroll-Tax Financed Social Insurance with Variable Retirement: Comment," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 88(1), pages 51-54.
- Hammond, Peter & Myles, Gareth (ed.), 2000. "Incentives, Organization, and Public Economics: Papers in Honour of Sir James Mirrlees," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780199242290, September.
- Alan J. Auerbach, 1988. "Capital Gains Taxation in the United States: Realizations, Revenue, and Rhetoric," Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Economic Studies Program, The Brookings Institution, vol. 19(2), pages 595-638.
- Jukka Pirttilä & Håkan Selin, 2011. "Income Shifting within a Dual Income Tax System: Evidence from the Finnish Tax Reform of 1993," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 113(1), pages 120-144, 03.
- Mankiw, N. Gregory & Weinzierl, Matthew Charles & Yagan, Danny Ferris, 2009.
"Optimal Taxation in Theory and Practice,"
Scholarly Articles
4263739, Harvard University Department of Economics.
- N. Gregory Mankiw & Matthew Weinzierl & Danny Yagan, 2009. "Optimal Taxation in Theory and Practice," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 23(4), pages 147-74, Fall.
- N. Gregory Mankiw & Matthew Weinzierl & Danny Yagan, 2009. "Optimal Taxation in Theory and Practice," NBER Working Papers 15071, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- N. Gregory Mankiw & Matthew C. Weinzierl & Danny Yagan, 2009. "Optimal Taxation in Theory and Practice," Harvard Business School Working Papers 09-140, Harvard Business School.
- Slemrod, Joel, 1995. "Income Creation or Income Shifting? Behavioral Responses to the Tax Reform Act of 1986," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 85(2), pages 175-80, May.
- Louis Kaplow, 2004.
"On the Undesirability of Commodity Taxation Even When Income Taxation is Not Optimal,"
NBER Working Papers
10407, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Kaplow, Louis, 2006. "On the undesirability of commodity taxation even when income taxation is not optimal," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 90(6-7), pages 1235-1250, August.
- Peter A. Diamond, 2003.
"Taxation, Incomplete Markets, and Social Security,"
MIT Press Books,
The MIT Press,
edition 1, volume 1, number 0262042134.
- Peter A. Diamond, 2005. "Taxation, Incomplete Markets, and Social Security," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262541823.
- Martin S. Feldstein & James R. Hines, Jr. & R. Glenn Hubbard, 1995. "Introduction to "The Effects of Taxation on Multinational Corporations"," NBER Chapters, in: The Effects of Taxation on Multinational Corporations, pages 1-6 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Emmanuel Saez & Joel B. Slemrod & Seth H. Giertz, 2009.
"The Elasticity of Taxable Income with Respect to Marginal Tax Rates: A Critical Review,"
NBER Working Papers
15012, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Emmanuel Saez & Joel Slemrod & Seth H. Giertz, 2012. "The Elasticity of Taxable Income with Respect to Marginal Tax Rates: A Critical Review," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 50(1), pages 3-50, March.
- Kopczuk, Wojciech, 2005.
"Tax bases, tax rates and the elasticity of reported income,"
Journal of Public Economics,
Elsevier, vol. 89(11-12), pages 2093-2119, December.
- Wojciech Kopczuk, 2004. "Tax bases, tax rates and the elasticity of reported income," Discussion Papers 0304-15, Columbia University, Department of Economics.
- Wojciech Kopczuk, 2003. "Tax Bases, Tax Rates and the Elasticity of Reported Income," NBER Working Papers 10044, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Mikhail Golosov & Aleh Tsyvinsky & Matthew Weinzierl, 2010. "Preference Heterogeneity and Optimal Capital Taxation," STICERD - Public Economics Programme Discussion Papers 07, Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines, LSE.
- Austan Goolsbee, 2000.
"What Happens When You Tax the Rich? Evidence from Executive Compensation,"
Journal of Political Economy,
University of Chicago Press, vol. 108(2), pages 352-378, April.
- Austan Goolsbee, 1997. "What Happens When You Tax the Rich? Evidence from Executive Compensation," NBER Working Papers 6333, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Slemrod, Joel & Kopczuk, Wojciech, 2002.
"The optimal elasticity of taxable income,"
Journal of Public Economics,
Elsevier, vol. 84(1), pages 91-112, April.
- Joel Slemrod & Wojciech Kopczuk, 2000. "The Optimal Elasticity of Taxable Income," NBER Working Papers 7922, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Martin Feldstein & James R. Hines Jr. & R. Glenn Hubbard, 1995. "The Effects of Taxation on Multinational Corporations," NBER Books, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc, number feld95-2, April.
- Diamond, Peter A & Mirrlees, James A, 1986. " Payroll-Tax Financed Social Insurance with Variable Retirement," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 88(1), pages 25-50.
- Barro, Robert J, 1986. " Payroll-Tax Financed Social Insurance with Variable Retirement: Comment," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 88(1), pages 55-58.
- (IFS), Institute for Fiscal Studies (ed.), 2010. "Dimensions of Tax Design: The Mirrlees Review," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780199553754, September.
Citations
Blog mentions
As found by EconAcademics.org, the blog aggregator for Economics research:- 75%
by Antoine Belgodere in Optimum on 2012-06-06 17:37:00 - Les nouvelles tranches d'imposition de François Hollande: des exemples chiffrés
by contact@captaineconomics.fr (Le Captain') in Captain Economics on 2012-05-08 19:25:17 - A combien faut-il taxer les riches? La réponse de deux professeurs du MIT & Berkeley
by contact@captaineconomics.fr (Le Captain') in Captain Economics on 2012-05-08 20:17:48 - The Price of Inequality: the Good, the Bad, and the Ugly
by Jonathan Finegold in Economic Thought on 2012-12-22 16:00:07
Cited by:
- Hans Fehr & Fabian Kindermann, 2012. "Optimal Taxation with Current and Future Cohorts," CESifo Working Paper Series 3973, CESifo Group Munich.
- Ugo Colombino, 2011.
"Five issues in the design of income support mechanisms. The case of Italy,"
CHILD Working Papers
wp21_11, CHILD - Centre for Household, Income, Labour and Demographic economics - ITALY.
- Colombino, Ugo, 2011. "Five Issues in the Design of Income Support Mechanisms: The Case of Italy," IZA Discussion Papers 6059, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
- Tomer Blumkin & Efraim Sadka & Yotam Shem-Tov, 2012. "International Tax Competition: Zero Tax Rate at the Top Re-established," CESifo Working Paper Series 3820, CESifo Group Munich.
- Lukasz Rawdanowicz & Eckhard Wurzel & Ane Kathrine Christensen, 2013. "The Equity Implications of Fiscal Consolidation," OECD Economics Department Working Papers 1013, OECD Publishing.
- Tibor Hanappi & Sandra Müllbacher, 2012. "Tax Incentives and Family Labor Supply in Austria," NRN working papers 2012-12, The Austrian Center for Labor Economics and the Analysis of the Welfare State, Johannes Kepler University Linz, Austria.
- Berliant, Marcus & Fujishima, Shota, 2012. "Optimal dynamic nonlinear income taxes: facing an uncertain future with a sluggish government," MPRA Paper 41947, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Abraham, Arpad & Koehne, Sebastian & Pavoni, Nicola, 2012.
"Optimal income taxation with asset accumulation,"
MPRA Paper
38629, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Sebastian Koehne & Nicola Pavoni & Arpad Abraham, 2011. "Optimal Income Taxation with Asset Accumulation," 2011 Meeting Papers 1161, Society for Economic Dynamics.
- Isabelle Joumard & Mauro Pisu & Debbie Bloch, 2012. "Tackling income inequality: The role of taxes and transfers," OECD Journal: Economic Studies, OECD Publishing, vol. 2012(1), pages 37-70.
- Bargain, Olivier & Dolls, Mathias & Immervoll, Herwig & Neumann, Dirk & Peichl, Andreas & Pestel, Nico & Siegloch, Sebastian, 2013. "Partisan Tax Policy and Income Inequality in the U.S., 1979-2007," IZA Discussion Papers 7190, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
- Keuschnigg, Christian, 2011. "Intra- und intergenerative Gerechtigkeit in der Finanzpolitik," Economics Working Paper Series 1137, University of St. Gallen, School of Economics and Political Science.
- Patricia Apps & Ngo Van Long & Ray Rees, 2009.
"Optimal Piecewise Linear Income Taxation,"
CESifo Working Paper Series
2565, CESifo Group Munich.
- Patricia Apps & Ngo Van Long & Ray Rees, 2011. "Optimal Piecewise Linear Income Taxation," CEPR Discussion Papers 655, Centre for Economic Policy Research, Research School of Economics, Australian National University.
- Apps, Patricia & Long, Ngo Van & Rees, Ray, 2011. "Optimal Piecewise Linear Income Taxation," IZA Discussion Papers 6007, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
- Colombino, Ugo & Narazani, Edlira, 2012.
"What's Best for Women: Gender Based Taxation, Wage Subsidies or Basic Income?,"
IZA Discussion Papers
6828, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
- Colombino Ugo & Narazani Edlira, 2012. "What’s Best for Women: Gender Based Taxation, Wage Subsidies or Basic Income?"," Department of Economics Working Papers 201212, University of Turin.
Lists
This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.Statistics
Access and download statisticsCorrections
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:aea:jecper:v:25:y:2011:i:4:p:165-90For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Jane Voros) or (Michael P. Albert).
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.
If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

