Optimal Taxation of Top Labor Incomes: A Tale of Three Elasticities
AbstractThis paper presents a model of optimal labor income taxation where top incomes respond to marginal tax rates through three channels: (1) standard labor supply, (2) tax avoidance, (3) compensation bargaining. We derive the optimal top tax rate formula as a function of the three corresponding behavioral elasticities. The first elasticity (labor supply) is the sole real factor limiting optimal top tax rates. The optimal tax system should be designed to minimize the second elasticity (avoidance) through tax enforcement and tax neutrality across income forms. The optimal top tax rate increases with the third elasticity (bargaining) as bargaining efforts are zero-sum in aggregate. We provide evidence using cross-country times series macro-evidence and CEO pay micro-evidence. The macro-evidence from 18 OECD countries shows that there is a strong negative correlation between top tax rates and top 1% income shares since 1960, implying that the overall elasticity is large. However, top income share increases have not translated into higher economic growth. US CEO pay evidence shows that pay for luck is quantitatively more important when top tax rates are low. International CEO pay evidence shows that CEO pay is strongly negatively correlated with top tax rates even controlling for rm characteristics and performance, and this correlation is stronger in firms with poor governance. These results are consistent with bargaining effects playing a role in the link between top incomes and top tax rates. If bargaining effects in fact exist, optimal tax rates should be higher than commonly assumed.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc in its series NBER Working Papers with number 17616.
Date of creation: Nov 2011
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- Piketty, Thomas & Saez, Emmanuel & Stantcheva, Stefanie, 2011. "Optimal Taxation of Top Labor Incomes: A Tale of Three Elasticities," CEPR Discussion Papers 8675, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Stefanie Stantcheva & Emmanuel Saez & Thomas Piketty, 2012. "Optimal Taxation of Top Labor Incomes: A Tale of Three Elasticities," 2012 Meeting Papers 78, Society for Economic Dynamics.
- H21 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Efficiency; Optimal Taxation
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Blog mentionsAs found by EconAcademics.org, the blog aggregator for Economics research:
- Given the enormity of the short- and long-run fiscal challenges facing the US, the lack of policy detail from both presidential candidates is disappointing
by Blog Admin in British Politics and Policy at LSE on 2012-10-25 13:00:36
- A. B. Atkinson & J. E. Søgaard, 2013. "The long-run history of income inequality in Denmark: Top incomes from 1870 to 2010," EPRU Working Paper Series 2013-01, Economic Policy Research Unit (EPRU), University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics.
- Philipp Doerrenberg & Denvil Duncan, 2012.
"Experimental Evidence on the Relationship between Tax Evasion Opportunities and Labor Supply,"
Cologne Graduate School Working Paper Series
03-10, Cologne Graduate School in Management, Economics and Social Sciences.
- Doerrenberg, Philipp & Duncan, Denvil, 2012. "Experimental Evidence on the Relationship between Tax Evasion Opportunities and Labor Supply," IZA Discussion Papers 6914, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
- Bargain, Olivier & Dolls, Mathias & Immervoll, Herwig & Neumann, Dirk & Peichl, Andreas & Pestel, Nico & Siegloch, Sebastian, 2013. "Partisan Tax Policy and Income Inequality in the U.S., 1979-2007," IZA Discussion Papers 7190, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
- Balazs Egert, 2013.
"The Efficiency and Equity of the Tax and Transfer System in France,"
CESifo Working Paper Series
4210, CESifo Group Munich.
- Balázs Égert, 2013. "The Efficiency and Equity of the Tax and Transfer System in France," OECD Economics Department Working Papers 1038, OECD Publishing.
- Jarkko Harju & Tuomas Matikka, 2013. "Entrepreneurs and income-shifting: Empirical evidence from a Finnish tax reform," Working Papers 43, Government Institute for Economic Research Finland (VATT).
- Jäntti, Markus & Pirttilä, Jukka & Selin, Håkan, 2013. "Estimating labour supply elasticities based on cross-country micro data: A bridge between micro and macro estimates?," Working Paper Series, Center for Fiscal Studies 2013:1, Uppsala University, Department of Economics.
- Santo Milasi, 2012. "Top Income Shares and Budget Deficits," CEIS Research Paper 249, Tor Vergata University, CEIS, revised 01 Aug 2012.
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