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Information in Conflicts

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Author Info
Wärneryd, Karl () (Dept. of Economics, Stockholm School of Economics)

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Abstract

We consider a two-player contest for a prize of common but uncertain value. We show that less resources are spent in equilibrium if one party is privately informed about the value of the prize than if either both agents are informed or neither agent is informed. Furthermore, the uninformed agent is ex ante strictly more likely to win the prize than is the informed agent.

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Stockholm School of Economics in its series Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance with number 388.

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Length: 17 pages
Date of creation: 19 Jun 2000
Date of revision:
Publication status: Published in Journal of Economic Theory, 2003, pages 121-136.
Handle: RePEc:hhs:hastef:0388

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Related research
Keywords: Conflict; contest; asymmetric information; all-pay auction.;

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:
C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure and Pricing - - - Auctions
D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Models of Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information

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Cited by:
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  1. Qiang Fu, 2006. "Endogenous timing of contest with asymmetric information," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 129(1), pages 1-23, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. TREICH Nicolas, 2009. "Risk-aversion and Prudence in Rent-seeking Games," Working Papers 09.05.281, LERNA, University of Toulouse. [Downloadable!]
  3. Mark Fey, 2008. "Rent-seeking contests with incomplete information," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 135(3), pages 225-236, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Johannes Münster, 2006. "Contests with an unknown number of contestants," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 129(3), pages 353-368, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Michelle R. Garfinkel & Stergios Skaperdas, 2006. "Economics of Conflict: An Overview," Working Papers 050623, University of California-Irvine, Department of Economics, revised Sep 2006. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  6. Lambert Schoonbeek & Barbara Winkel, 2006. "Activity and inactivity in a rent-seeking contest with private information," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 127(1), pages 123-132, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Gil Epstein & Igal Milchtaich & Shmuel Nitzan & Mordechai Schwarz, 2007. "Ambiguous political power and contest efforts," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 132(1), pages 113-123, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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