Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login to save this paper or follow this series

Rent-seeking Contests under Symmetric and Asymmetric Information

Contents:

Author Info

  • Wasser, Cédric

Abstract

We consider a variant of the Tullock rent-seeking contest. Under symmetric information we determine equilibrium strategies and prove their uniqueness. Then, we assume contestants to be privately informed about their costs of effort. We prove existence of a pure-strategy equilibrium and provide a sufficient condition for uniqueness. Comparing different informational settings we find that if players are uncertain about the costs of all players, aggregate effort is lower than under both private and complete information. Yet, under additional assumptions, rent dissipation is still smaller in the latter settings. Numerical examples illustrate that there is no general ranking between private and complete information. The results depend on the distribution costs are drawn from and on the exact specification of the contest success function.

Download Info

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
File URL: http://epub.ub.uni-muenchen.de/13243/1/311.pdf
Download Restriction: no

Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich in its series Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems with number 311.

as in new window
Length:
Date of creation: Mar 2010
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:trf:wpaper:311

Contact details of provider:
Postal: Geschwister-Scholl-Platz 1, D-80539 Munich, Germany
Phone: +49-(0)89-2180-3405
Fax: +49-(0)89-2180-3510
Web page: http://www.sfbtr15.de/
More information through EDIRC

Related research

Keywords: Rent-seeking; Contest; Asymmetric Information; Private values;

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

References

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
as in new window
  1. Vijay Krishna & John Morgan, 1994. "An Analysis of the War of Attrition and the All-Pay Auction," Game Theory and Information 9409002, EconWPA.
  2. Athey, Susan, 2001. "Single Crossing Properties and the Existence of Pure Strategy Equilibria in Games of Incomplete Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 69(4), pages 861-89, July.
  3. J. Amegashie, 2006. "A contest success function with a tractable noise parameter," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 126(1), pages 135-144, January.
  4. Baye, M. & Kovenock, D. & Vries, C. de, 1990. "The All-Pay Auction with Complete Information," Discussion Paper 1990-51, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
  5. Richard Cornes & Roger Hartley, 2005. "Asymmetric contests with general technologies," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 26(4), pages 923-946, November.
  6. Mark Fey, 2008. "Rent-seeking contests with incomplete information," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 135(3), pages 225-236, June.
  7. Christian Ewerhart, 2010. "Rent-seeking contests with independent private values," IEW - Working Papers 490, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - University of Zurich.
  8. Ryvkin, Dmitry, 2010. "Contests with private costs: Beyond two players," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 26(4), pages 558-567, December.
  9. Hurley, Terrance M. & Shogren, Jason F., 1998. "Asymmetric information contests," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 14(4), pages 645-665, November.
  10. Arye L. Hillman & John G. Riley, 1987. "Politically Contestable Rents and Transfers," UCLA Economics Working Papers 452, UCLA Department of Economics.
  11. Hurley, Terrance M. & Shogren, Jason F., 1998. "Effort levels in a Cournot Nash contest with asymmetric information," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 69(2), pages 195-210, June.
  12. Stergios Skaperdas, 1996. "Contest success functions (*)," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 7(2), pages 283-290.
  13. Nti, Kofi O, 1999. " Rent-Seeking with Asymmetric Valuations," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 98(3-4), pages 415-30, March.
  14. Konrad, Kai A., 2009. "Strategy and Dynamics in Contests," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780199549603, October.
  15. Szidarovszky, Ferenc & Okuguchi, Koji, 1997. "On the Existence and Uniqueness of Pure Nash Equilibrium in Rent-Seeking Games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 18(1), pages 135-140, January.
  16. Morath, Florian & Münster, Johannes, 2008. "Private versus complete information in auctions," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 101(3), pages 214-216, December.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

Citations

Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
as in new window

Cited by:
  1. Thomas Giebe & Paul Schweinzer, 2013. "Probabilistic Procurement Auctions," CESifo Working Paper Series 4320, CESifo Group Munich.
  2. Ezra Einy & Ori Haimanko & Diego Moreno & A. Sela & Benyamin Shitovitz, 2013. "Tullock contests with asymmetric information," Economics Working Papers we1314, Universidad Carlos III, Departamento de Economía.
  3. Ezra Einy & Diego Moreno & Benyamin Shitovitz, 2014. "The value of public information in common value Tullock contests," Economics Working Papers we1401, Universidad Carlos III, Departamento de Economía, revised Mar 2014.
  4. Ezra Einy & Ori Haimanko & Diego Moreno & Aner Sela & Benyamin Shitovitz, 2013. "Tullock Contests With Asymmetric Information," Working Papers 1303, Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, Department of Economics.
  5. Alexander Matros & Alex Possajennikov, . "Common Value Allocation Mechanisms with Private Information: Lotteries or Auctions?," Discussion Papers 2014-07, The Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics, School of Economics, University of Nottingham.
  6. Einy, E & Haimanko, O & Moreno, D & Sela, A & Shitovitz, B, 2013. "Tullock Contests with Asymmetric Information," Discussion Papers 2013-11, Graduate School of Economics, Hitotsubashi University.
  7. Thomas Giebe & Paul Schweinzer, 2012. "Fuzzy Price-Quality Ratio Procurement under Incomplete Information," Discussion Papers 12/26, Department of Economics, University of York.

Lists

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Corrections

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:trf:wpaper:311. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Alexandra Frank).

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.