Download Info

To download:

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. Information about this may be contained in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.

Publisher Info

Article provided by Springer in its journal Public Choice.

Volume (Year): 135 (2008)
Issue (Month): 3 (June)
Pages: 225-236
Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML (with abstract), plain text (with abstract), BibTeX, RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite), ReDIF
Handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:135:y:2008:i:3:p:225-236

Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.springerlink.com/link.asp?id=100332

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Christopher F. Baum).

Related research

Keywords: Rent-seeking; Contests; Conflict; Private information; Equilibrium existence; D72; C72;

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

1. Nitzan, Shmuel, 1991. "Collective Rent Dissipation," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 101(409), pages 1522-34, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
2. Skaperdas, Stergios, 1996. "Contest Success Functions," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 7(2), pages 283-90, February.
   Other versions:
   • Stergios Skaperdas, 1996. "Contest success functions (*)," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 7(2), pages 283-290.
3. Arye L. Hillman & John G. Riley, 1987. "Politically Contestable Rents and Transfers," UCLA Economics Working Papers 452, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
4. Warneryd, Karl, 2003. "Information in conflicts," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 110(1), pages 121-136, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
   Other versions:
   • Wärneryd, Karl, 2000. "Information in Conflicts," Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance 388, Stockholm School of Economics.
5. Hurley, Terrance M. & Shogren, Jason F., 1998. "Effort levels in a Cournot Nash contest with asymmetric information," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 69(2), pages 195-210, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
6. Bernardo, Antonio E & Talley, Eric & Welch, Ivo, 2000. "A Theory of Legal Presumptions," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 16(1), pages 1-49, April.
   Other versions:
   • Antonio Bernardo & Eric L. Talley & Ivo Welch, 1999. "A Theory of Legal Presumptions," Yale School of Management Working Papers ysm118, Yale School of Management. [Downloadable!]

Did you know? Want to help out with this project? Look for volunteer opportunities.

This page was last updated on 2009-11-25.