Existence of a pure-strategy Bayesian Nash equilibrium in imperfectly discriminating contests
AbstractWe consider a general class of imperfectly discriminating contests with privately informed players. We show that findings by Athey (2001) imply the existence of a Bayesian Nash equilibrium in monotone pure strategies.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich in its series Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems with number 331.
Date of creation: Jul 2010
Date of revision:
Contact details of provider:
Postal: Geschwister-Scholl-Platz 1, D-80539 Munich, Germany
Web page: http://www.sfbtr15.de/
More information through EDIRC
contest; imperfectly discriminating; asymmetric information; equilibrium existence; interdependent values;
Other versions of this item:
- Wasser, Cédric, 2013. "A note on Bayesian Nash equilibria in imperfectly discriminating contests," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 66(2), pages 180-182.
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
- D74 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2010-08-28 (All new papers)
- NEP-CTA-2010-08-28 (Contract Theory & Applications)
- NEP-GTH-2010-08-28 (Game Theory)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Richard Cornes & Roger Hartley, 2005.
"Asymmetric contests with general technologies,"
Economic Theory, Springer,
Springer, vol. 26(4), pages 923-946, November.
- Richard Cornes & Roger Hartley, 2002. "Asymmetric Contests with General Technologies," Keele Economics Research Papers, Centre for Economic Research, Keele University KERP 2002/22, Centre for Economic Research, Keele University.
- Mark Fey, 2008. "Rent-seeking contests with incomplete information," Public Choice, Springer, Springer, vol. 135(3), pages 225-236, June.
- Jack Hirshleifer, 1989. "Conflict and rent-seeking success functions: Ratio vs. difference models of relative success," Public Choice, Springer, Springer, vol. 63(2), pages 101-112, November.
- Hurley, Terrance M. & Shogren, Jason F., 1998. "Asymmetric information contests," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 14(4), pages 645-665, November.
- Ryvkin, Dmitry, 2010. "Contests with private costs: Beyond two players," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 26(4), pages 558-567, December.
- Edward P. Lazear & Sherwin Rosen, 1979.
"Rank-Order Tournaments as Optimum Labor Contracts,"
NBER Working Papers
0401, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Lazear, Edward P & Rosen, Sherwin, 1981. "Rank-Order Tournaments as Optimum Labor Contracts," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, University of Chicago Press, vol. 89(5), pages 841-64, October.
- Karl Wärneryd, 2012. "Multi-player contests with asymmetric information," Economic Theory, Springer, Springer, vol. 51(2), pages 277-287, October.
- Vijay Krishna & John Morgan, 1994.
"An Analysis of the War of Attrition and the All-Pay Auction,"
Game Theory and Information, EconWPA
- Krishna, Vijay & Morgan, John, 1997. "An Analysis of the War of Attrition and the All-Pay Auction," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 72(2), pages 343-362, February.
- Che, Yeon-Koo & Gale, Ian, 2000.
"Difference-Form Contests and the Robustness of All-Pay Auctions,"
Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier,
Elsevier, vol. 30(1), pages 22-43, January.
- Che,Y.K. & Gale,I., 1998. "Difference-form contests and the robustness of all-pay auctions," Working papers, Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems 6, Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems.
- Athey, Susan, 2001.
"Single Crossing Properties and the Existence of Pure Strategy Equilibria in Games of Incomplete Information,"
Econometrica, Econometric Society,
Econometric Society, vol. 69(4), pages 861-89, July.
- Athey, S., 1997. "Sigle Crossing Properties and the Existence of Pure Strategy Equilibria in Games of Incomplete Information," Working papers, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics 97-11, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
- Konrad, Kai A., 2009. "Strategy and Dynamics in Contests," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, Oxford University Press, number 9780199549603, October.
- Warneryd, Karl, 2003.
"Information in conflicts,"
Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier,
Elsevier, vol. 110(1), pages 121-136, May.
- Wärneryd, Karl, 2001. "Information in conflicts," Discussion Papers, Research Unit: Market Processes and Governance FS IV 01-11, Social Science Research Center Berlin (WZB).
- Wärneryd, Karl, 2000. "Information in Conflicts," Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance 388, Stockholm School of Economics.
- Dasgupta, Ani & Nti, Kofi O., 1998. "Designing an optimal contest," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 14(4), pages 587-603, November.
- Blavatskyy, Pavlo R., 2010. "Contest success function with the possibility of a draw: Axiomatization," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 46(2), pages 267-276, March.
- Stergios Skaperdas, 1996.
"Contest success functions (*),"
Economic Theory, Springer,
Springer, vol. 7(2), pages 283-290.
- Christian Ewerhart, 2014. "Unique equilibrium in rent-seeking contests with a continuum of types," ECON - Working Papers, Department of Economics - University of Zurich 159, Department of Economics - University of Zurich.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Alexandra Frank).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.