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Multiple Equilibria in Tullock Contests

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  • Subhasish M. Chowdhury

    ()
    (School of Economics, University of East Anglia)

  • Roman M. Sheremeta

    (Argyros School of Business and Economics, Chapman University)

Abstract

We find the sufficient conditions for the existence of multiple equilibria in Tullock-type contests and show that asymmetric equilibria may arise even under symmetric prize and cost structures. We also identify contests in the literature where multiple equilibria exist under reasonably weak conditions.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by School of Economics, University of East Anglia, Norwich, UK. in its series University of East Anglia Applied and Financial Economics Working Paper Series with number 014.

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Date of creation: 17 Sep 2010
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Handle: RePEc:uea:aepppr:2010_14

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Keywords: rent-seeking; contest; asymmetric equilibrium; multiple equilibria;

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References

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  1. Subhasish M. Chowdhury & Roman M. Sheremeta, 2010. "A generalized Tullock contest," Working Papers 10-08, Chapman University, Economic Science Institute.
  2. Baye, M.R. & Kovenock D. & De Vries, C.G., 2000. "Comparative Analysis of Litigation Systems: an Auction-Theoretic Approach," Purdue University Economics Working Papers 1137, Purdue University, Department of Economics.
  3. Takeshi Yamazaki, 2008. "On the Existence and Uniqueness of Pure-Strategy Nash Equilibrium in Asymmetric Rent-Seeking Contests," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 10(2), pages 317-327, 04.
  4. Skaperdas, Stergios, 1996. "Contest Success Functions," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 7(2), pages 283-90, February.
  5. Christian Riis & Derek J. Clark, 1997. "Contest success functions: an extension," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 11(1), pages 201-204.
  6. Cohen, Chen & Sela, Aner, 2005. "Manipulations in contests," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 86(1), pages 135-139, January.
  7. Richard Cornes & Roger Hartley, 2005. "Asymmetric contests with general technologies," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 26(4), pages 923-946, November.
  8. Alexander Matros & Daniel Armanios, 2009. "Tullock’s contest with reimbursements," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 141(1), pages 49-63, October.
  9. Amegashie, J Atsu, 1999. " The Number of Rent-Seekers and Aggregate Rent-Seeking Expenditures: An Unpleasant Result," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 99(1-2), pages 57-62, April.
  10. Mark Gradstein, 1995. "Intensity Of Competition, Entry And Entry Deterrence In Rent Seeking Contests," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 7(1), pages 79-91, 03.
  11. Szidarovszky, Ferenc & Okuguchi, Koji, 1997. "On the Existence and Uniqueness of Pure Nash Equilibrium in Rent-Seeking Games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 18(1), pages 135-140, January.
  12. Glazer, Amihai & Konrad, Kai A., 1999. "Taxation of rent-seeking activities," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 72(1), pages 61-72, April.
  13. Paul, Chris & Wilhite, Al, 1990. " Efficient Renk-Seeking under Varying Cost Structures," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 64(3), pages 279-90, March.
  14. Alexander Matros, 2006. "Sad-Loser Lottery," Working Papers 204, University of Pittsburgh, Department of Economics, revised Dec 2008.
  15. Baye, Michael R. & Hoppe, Heidrun C., 2003. "The strategic equivalence of rent-seeking, innovation, and patent-race games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 44(2), pages 217-226, August.
  16. Nti, Kofi O, 1999. " Rent-Seeking with Asymmetric Valuations," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 98(3-4), pages 415-30, March.
  17. Matros, Alexander, 2012. "Sad-Loser contests," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 48(3), pages 155-162.
  18. Chung, Tai-Yeong, 1996. " Rent-Seeking Contest When the Prize Increases with Aggregate Efforts," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 87(1-2), pages 55-66, April.
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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Chowdhury, Subhasish M. & Lee, Dongryul & Sheremeta, Roman M., 2013. "Top guns may not fire: Best-shot group contests with group-specific public good prizes," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 92(C), pages 94-103.
  2. Einy, E & Haimanko, O & Moreno, D & Sela, A & Shitovitz, B, 2013. "Tullock Contests with Asymmetric Information," Discussion Papers 2013-11, Graduate School of Economics, Hitotsubashi University.
  3. Sheremeta, Roman, 2013. "Overbidding and Heterogeneous Behavior in Contest Experiments," MPRA Paper 44124, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  4. Amegashie, J. Atsu, 2012. "A nested contest: Tullock meets the All-Pay Auction," MPRA Paper 41654, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 03 Sep 2012.
  5. Ezra Einy & Ori Haimanko & Diego Moreno & A. Sela & Benyamin Shitovitz, 2013. "Tullock contests with asymmetric information," Economics Working Papers we1314, Universidad Carlos III, Departamento de Economía.
  6. Robert Shupp & Roman M. Sheremeta & David Schmidt & James Walker, 2013. "Resource Allocation Contests: Experimental Evidence," Working Papers 13-23, Chapman University, Economic Science Institute.
  7. Chowdhury, Subhasish & Sheremeta, Roman, 2014. "Strategically Equivalent Contests," MPRA Paper 55450, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  8. Ezra Einy & Ori Haimanko & Diego Moreno & Aner Sela & Benyamin Shitovitz, 2013. "Tullock Contests With Asymmetric Information," Working Papers 1303, Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, Department of Economics.
  9. J. Atsu Amegashie, 2012. "A Nested Contest: Tullock Meets the All-pay Auction," CESifo Working Paper Series 3976, CESifo Group Munich.
  10. Derek Clark & Tore Nilssen, 2013. "Learning by doing in contests," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 156(1), pages 329-343, July.
  11. Sean P. Hargreaves Heap & Abhijit Ramalingam & Siddharth Ramalingam & Brock V. Stoddard, 2013. "Inequality and Effort: An Experiment on Competition Between Teams," Working Paper series, University of East Anglia, Centre for Behavioural and Experimental Social Science (CBESS) 13-08, School of Economics, University of East Anglia, Norwich, UK..
  12. Matros, Alexander, 2012. "Sad-Loser contests," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 48(3), pages 155-162.

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