The category of conflict encompasses not only war but also crime, litigation, strikes and lockouts, and redistributive politics. Exchange theory and conflict theory constitute two coequal branches of economic analysis, the first based upon contract and mutual gain, the second upon contest for asymmetric advantage. A number of the analytic options for modelling conflict are reviewed. Preferences, opportunities, and perceptions are shown to determine the choice between conflict and settlement. The technology of conflict as an economic activity is surveyed. Two illustrative models are presented, the first involving actual fighting and the other armed peace.
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ReDIF This chapter was published in: Keith Hartley & Todd Sandler (ed.) Handbook of Defense Economics, , chapter 07, pages 165-189, 1995.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Heidi Boesdal).
Related research
This chapter was published in the following book, which is listed on IDEAS: Keith Hartley & Todd Sandler (ed.), 1995.
"Handbook of Defense Economics,"
Handbook of Defense Economics,
Elsevier,
edition 1, volume 1, number 1.
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