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Bribery and public procurement: an experimental study

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Author Info

  • Susanne Büchner

    ()

  • Andreas Freytag

    ()

  • Luis González

    ()

  • Werner Güth

    ()

Abstract

A procurement contract is granted by a bureaucrat (the auctioneer) who is interested in a low price and a bribe from the provider. The optimal bids and bribes are derived based on an iid private cost assumption. In the experiment, bribes are negatively framed (betweensubjects treatment) to capture that society is better off if bribes are rare or low. Although bids are lower than predicted, behavior is qualitatively in line with the linear equilibrium prediction. When bribes generate a negative externality, there is a significant increase in the variability of the data.

(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)

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File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/s11127-008-9315-9
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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Springer in its journal Public Choice.

Volume (Year): 137 (2008)
Issue (Month): 1 (October)
Pages: 103-117

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Handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:137:y:2008:i:1:p:103-117

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Web page: http://www.springerlink.com/link.asp?id=100332

Related research

Keywords: Corruption; Procurement auctions;

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References

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  1. Gökhan R. Karahan & Laura Razzolini & William F. Shughart II, 2002. "Centralized versus decentralized decision-making in a county government setting," Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 3(2), pages 101-115, 07.
  2. Marco Celentani & Juan J. Ganuza, 2000. "Corruption and competition in procurement," Economics Working Papers 464, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, revised Mar 2001.
  3. Yvan Lengwiler & Elmar G. Wolfstetter, 2000. "Auctions and Corruption," CESifo Working Paper Series 401, CESifo Group Munich.
  4. Mark Duggan & Steven D. Levitt, 2002. "Winning Isn't Everything: Corruption in Sumo Wrestling," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 92(5), pages 1594-1605, December.
  5. Klaus Abbink, 2006. "Laboratory experiments on corruption," Monash Economics Working Papers archive-38, Monash University, Department of Economics.
  6. Beck, Paul J. & Maher, Michael W., 1986. "A comparison of bribery and bidding in thin markets," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 20(1), pages 1-5.
  7. Lien, Da-Hsiang Donald, 1986. "A note on competitive bribery games," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 22(4), pages 337-341.
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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Vetter, Stefan, 2012. "Delegation and Rewards," Discussion Papers in Economics 12884, University of Munich, Department of Economics.
  2. Kimbrough, Erik & Sheremeta, Roman, 2013. "Side-Payments and the Costs of Conflict," MPRA Paper 46808, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  3. Erik O. Kimbrough & Roman Sheremeta, 2010. "Make Him an Offer He Can’t Refuse: Avoiding Conflicts through Side Payments," Working Papers 10-23, Chapman University, Economic Science Institute.
  4. Vetter, Stefan, 2013. "Delegating decision rights for anticipated rewards as an alternative to corruption: An experiment," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 31(C), pages 188-204.
  5. Jens J. Krüger, 2008. "The Sources Of Aggregate Productivity Growth: Us Manufacturing Industries, 1958-1996," Bulletin of Economic Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 60(4), pages 405-427, October.
  6. Simon Renaud, 2006. "Betriebsr�te und Strukturwandel," Jenaer Schriften zur Wirtschaftswissenschaft 04/2006, Friedrich-Schiller-Universität Jena, Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät.
  7. Holger Graf & Tobias Henning, 2009. "Public Research in Regional Networks of Innovators: A Comparative Study of Four East German Regions," Regional Studies, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 43(10), pages 1349-1368, December.
  8. Uwe Cantner & Andreas Meder, 2006. "Determinants influencing the choice of a cooperation partner," Jenaer Schriften zur Wirtschaftswissenschaft 20/2006, Friedrich-Schiller-Universität Jena, Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät.
  9. Simon Renaud, 2006. "Works Councils and Heterogeneous Firms," Jenaer Schriften zur Wirtschaftswissenschaft 16/2006, Friedrich-Schiller-Universität Jena, Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät.
  10. Jens J. Krüger & Kristina Dreßler, 2006. "Knowledge, Profitability and Exit of German Car Manufacturing Firms," Jenaer Schriften zur Wirtschaftswissenschaft 15/2006, Friedrich-Schiller-Universität Jena, Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät.
  11. Wolfgang Domschke & Armin Scholl, 2006. "Heuristische Verfahren," Jenaer Schriften zur Wirtschaftswissenschaft 08/2006, Friedrich-Schiller-Universität Jena, Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät.
  12. Mikael Priks, 2012. "Competition among officials and the abuse of power," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 150(3), pages 425-438, March.
  13. Axel Dreher & Lars-H. Siemers, 2009. "The nexus between corruption and capital account restrictions," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 140(1), pages 245-265, July.
  14. Christoph Engel & Sebastian Goerg & Gaoneng Yu, 2012. "Symmetric vs. Asymmetric Punishment Regimes for Bribery," Working Paper Series of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods 2012_01, Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods, revised May 2013.
  15. Vetter, Stefan, 2012. "Delegation and Rewards," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 378, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
  16. Armin Scholl & Nils Boysen & Malte Fliedner, 2006. "The sequence-dependent assembly line balancing problem," Jenaer Schriften zur Wirtschaftswissenschaft 18/2006, Friedrich-Schiller-Universität Jena, Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät.

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