This file is part of IDEAS, which uses RePEc data


[ Papers | Articles | Software | Books | Chapters | Authors | Institutions | JEL Classification | NEP reports | Search | New papers by email | Author registration | Rankings | Volunteers | FAQ | Blog | Help! ]

Competitive Procurement with Corruption

Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics
Author Info
Roberto Burguet () (Institut d'Análisi Ecoòmica (CSIC) and CREA)
Yeon-Koo Che () (University of Wisconsin)

Additional information is available for the following registered author(s):

Abstract

We study competitive procurement administered by a corrupt agent who is willing to manipulate his evaluation of contract proposals in exchange for bribes. With complete information and no corruption, the efficient firm will win the contract for sure. If the agent is corrupt and has large manipulation power, however, bribery makes it costly for the efficient firm to secure a sure win, so in equilibrium the efficient firm loses the contract with positive probability. The optimal scoring rule for the buyer deemphasizes quality relative to price and does not fully handicap, and may even favor, the efficient firm.

Download Info
To our knowledge, this item is not available for download. To find whether it is available, there are three options:
1. Check below under "Related research" whether another version of this item is available online.
2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.

Publisher Info
Article provided by The RAND Corporation in its journal RAND Journal of Economics.

Volume (Year): 35 (2004)
Issue (Month): 1 (Spring)
Pages: 50-68
Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML (with abstract), plain text (with abstract), BibTeX, RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite), ReDIF
Handle: RePEc:rje:randje:v:35:y:2004:1:p:50-68

Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.rje.org

Order Information:
Web: http://gemini.econ.umd.edu/cgi-bin/rje_online.cgi

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: ().

Related research
Keywords:

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Susanne Büchner & Andreas Freytag & Luis G. Gonzalez & Werner Güth, 2006. "Bribery and Public Procurement - An Experimental Study -," Papers on Strategic Interaction 2005-30, Max Planck Institute of Economics, Strategic Interaction Group. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  2. Federico Weinschelbaum & Leandro Arozamena, 2004. "The Effect of Corruption on Bidding Behavior in First-Price Auctions," Econometric Society 2004 Latin American Meetings 180, Econometric Society. [Downloadable!]
  3. Roy Radner & Ariane Lambert-Mogiliansky & Makul Majumdar, 2004. "Strategic Analysis of Petty Corruption: Entrepreneurs and Bureaucrats," Working Papers 04-22, New York University, Leonard N. Stern School of Business, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  4. Leonardo Rezende, 2009. "Biased procurement auctions," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 38(1), pages 169-185, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Berardino Cesi & Gian Luigi Albano, 2008. "Past Performance Evaluation in Repeated Procurement: A Simple Model of Handicapping," Working Papers 2008.19, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei. [Downloadable!]
  6. Yvan Lengwiler & Elmar G. Wolfstetter, 2005. "Bid Rigging – An Analysis of Corruption in Auctions," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo Group Munich. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  7. Andrea Fosfuri & Thomas Rønde, 2005. "Leveraging Resistance to Change and the Skunk Works Model of Innovation," CIE Discussion Papers 2007-10, University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics. Centre for Industrial Economics, revised Jun 2007. [Downloadable!]
  8. Ariane Lambert-Mogiliansky & Konstantin Sonin, 2005. "Collusive market-sharing and corruption in procurement," PSE Working Papers 2005-25, PSE (Ecole normale supérieure). [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  9. Hongbin Cai & J. Vernon Henderson & Qinghua Zhang, 2009. "China's Land Market Auctions: Evidence of Corruption," NBER Working Papers 15067, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  10. Ariane Lambert Mogiliansky & Grigory Kosenok, 2006. "Public Markets Tailored for the Cartel - Favoritism in Procurement Auctions -," PSE Working Papers 2006-39, PSE (Ecole normale supérieure). [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  11. Nicola Doni, 2007. "A Comparison of Alternative Procedures for the Selection of the Private Partner in PPP Projects," Working Papers Series wp2007_10, Universita' degli Studi di Firenze, Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche. [Downloadable!]
  12. Libor Dušek & Andreas Ortman & Lubomír Lízal, 2005. "Understanding Corruption And Corruptibility Through Experiments," Prague Economic Papers, University of Economics, Prague, vol. 2005(2), pages 147-162. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  13. Claudio Weber Abramo, 2003. "Prevention and detection in bribery-affected public procurement," Public Economics 0309001, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
  14. Craig Depken & Courtney Lafountain, 2006. "Fiscal consequences of public corruption: Empirical evidence from state bond ratings," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 126(1), pages 75-85, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  15. Duasa, Jarita, 2008. "Tendency of corruption and its determinants among public servants: A case study on Malaysia," MPRA Paper 11562, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]
Statistics
Access and download statistics

Did you know? Over five million full texts a year are downloaded through IDEAS.

This page was last updated on 2009-11-13.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Department of Economics, College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, University of Connecticut using RePEc data on a server sponsored by the Society for Economic Dynamics.