Auctions and Corruption
AbstractIn many auctions, the auctioneer is an agent of the seller. This delegation invites corruption. In this paper we propose a model of corruption, examine how corruption affects the auction game, how the anticipation of corruption affects bidding, and how it altogether changes the revenue ranking of typical auctions. In addition we characterize incentive schemes that may prevent corruption, and compare them to the fee schedules employed by major auction houses.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by CESifo Group Munich in its series CESifo Working Paper Series with number 401.
Date of creation: 2000
Date of revision:
Auctions; procurement; corruption; collusion; coalitions;
Other versions of this item:
- D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure and Pricing - - - Auctions
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"The Effect of Corruption on Bidding Behavior in First-Price Auctions,"
82, Universidad de San Andres, Departamento de Economia, revised Aug 2005.
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Jenaer Schriften zur Wirtschaftswissenschaft
06/2006, Friedrich-Schiller-Universität Jena, Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät.
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- Susanne Büchner & Andreas Freytag & Luis G. Gonzalez & Werner Güth, 2006. "Bribery and Public Procurement - An Experimental Study -," Papers on Strategic Interaction 2005-30, Max Planck Institute of Economics, Strategic Interaction Group.
- Jan Pavel & Emilia Sičáková-Beblavá, 2013. "Do E-Auctions Realy Improve the Efficiency of Public Procurement? The Case of the Slovak Municipalities," Prague Economic Papers, University of Economics, Prague, vol. 2013(1), pages 111-124.
- Þevket Alper Koç, 2008. "Effects Of Asymmetry On Ex Ante Corruption At Auctions," Bogazici Journal of Economics and Administrative Sciences, Bogazici University, Department of Economics, vol. 22(1+2), pages 17-33.
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