Auctions and Corruption
AbstractIn many auctions, the auctioneer is an agent of the seller. This delegation invites corruption. In this paper we propose a model of corruption, examine how corruption affects the auction game, how the anticipation of corruption affects bidding, and how it altogether changes the revenue ranking of typical auctions. In addition we characterize incentive schemes that may prevent corruption, and compare them to the fee schedules employed by major auction houses.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by CESifo Group Munich in its series CESifo Working Paper Series with number 401.
Date of creation: 2000
Date of revision:
Auctions; procurement; corruption; collusion; coalitions;
Other versions of this item:
- Lengwiler, Yvan & Wolfstetter, Elmar, 2000. "Auctions and corruption," SFB 373 Discussion Papers, Humboldt University of Berlin, Interdisciplinary Research Project 373: Quantification and Simulation of Economic Processes 2000,40, Humboldt University of Berlin, Interdisciplinary Research Project 373: Quantification and Simulation of Economic Processes.
- D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure and Pricing - - - Auctions
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