Multi-player, Multi-prize, Imperfectly Discriminating Contests
AbstractThis paper models success probability in imperfectly discriminating contests involving multiple players and multiple prizes. This turns out to be a generalization of Tullock's contest success function to a multiplayer, multi-prize situation. The model can be used to analyse e orts exerted by individuals in various real-life situations, like obtaining seats in congested public transportation vehicles or obtaining admission into elite educational institutes. We propose a \holistic" probability model, derive the equilibrium e orts exerted, and analyse those e orts, the associated total costs and total dissipation, and also pricing and the optimal number of 'seats'. We also discuss extensions of the model.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by HAL in its series Working Papers with number hal-00683688.
Date of creation: 29 Mar 2012
Date of revision:
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: http://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-00683688
Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2012-04-10 (All new papers)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Ian W.H. Parry & Kenneth A. Small, 2007.
"Should Urban Transit Subsidies Be Reduced?,"
060723, University of California-Irvine, Department of Economics.
- André de Palma & Nathalie Picard & Paul Waddell, 2007.
"Discrete choice models with capacity constraints: an empirical analysis of the housing market of the greater Paris region,"
THEMA Working Papers
2007-04, THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise.
- de Palma, Andre & Picard, Nathalie & Waddell, Paul, 2007. "Discrete choice models with capacity constraints: An empirical analysis of the housing market of the greater Paris region," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 62(2), pages 204-230, September.
- Benny Moldovanu & Aner Sela, 2001.
"The Optimal Allocation of Prizes in Contests,"
American Economic Review,
American Economic Association, vol. 91(3), pages 542-558, June.
- Johannes Münster, 2009. "Group contest success functions," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 41(2), pages 345-357, November.
- Nitzan, Shmuel, 1994. "Modelling rent-seeking contests," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 10(1), pages 41-60, May.
- Martimort, David & Stole, Lars, 2011. "Aggregate Representations of Aggregate Games," MPRA Paper 32871, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Arye L. Hillman & John G. Riley, 1989.
"Politically Contestable Rents And Transfers,"
Economics and Politics,
Wiley Blackwell, vol. 1(1), pages 17-39, 03.
- Rosen, Sherwin, 1986.
"Prizes and Incentives in Elimination Tournaments,"
American Economic Review,
American Economic Association, vol. 76(4), pages 701-15, September.
- Nti, Kofi O, 1997. "Comparative Statics of Contests and Rent-Seeking Games," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 38(1), pages 43-59, February.
- Vickrey, William S, 1969. "Congestion Theory and Transport Investment," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 59(2), pages 251-60, May.
- Pierre-Andre Chiappori & Robert McCann & Lars Nesheim, 2007.
"Hedonic price equilibria, stable matching, and optimal transport: equivalence, topology, and uniqueness,"
CeMMAP working papers
CWP23/07, Centre for Microdata Methods and Practice, Institute for Fiscal Studies.
- Pierre-André Chiappori & Robert McCann & Lars Nesheim, 2010. "Hedonic price equilibria, stable matching, and optimal transport: equivalence, topology, and uniqueness," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 42(2), pages 317-354, February.
- Blavatskyy, Pavlo R., 2010. "Contest success function with the possibility of a draw: Axiomatization," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 46(2), pages 267-276, March.
- Dixit, Avinash K, 1987. "Strategic Behavior in Contests," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 77(5), pages 891-98, December.
- Christian Riis & Derek J. Clark, 1997. "Contest success functions: an extension," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 11(1), pages 201-204.
- Stergios Skaperdas, 1996.
"Contest success functions (*),"
Springer, vol. 7(2), pages 283-290.
- Clark, Derek J & Riis, Christian, 1998. "Competition over More Than One Prize," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 88(1), pages 276-89, March.
- Stefan Szymanski, 2003. "The Economic Design of Sporting Contests," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 41(4), pages 1137-1187, December.
- Mohring, Herbert, 1972. "Optimization and Scale Economies in Urban Bus Transportation," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 62(4), pages 591-604, September.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (CCSD).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.