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Unfair contests

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  • E. Feess
  • Gerd Muehlheusser
  • M. Walzl

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  • E. Feess & Gerd Muehlheusser & M. Walzl, 2008. "Unfair contests," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 93(3), pages 267-291, April.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:jeczfn:v:93:y:2008:i:3:p:267-291
    DOI: 10.1007/s00712-007-0308-9
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    • Feess, E. & Muehlheusser, G. & Walzl, M., 2004. "Unfair contests," Research Memorandum 048, Maastricht University, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization (METEOR).

    References listed on IDEAS

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    18. Venus Khim-Sen Liew & Ahmad Zubaidi Baharumshahb & Evan Laub, 2004. "Nonlinear Adjustment towards Purchasing Power Parity in ASEAN Exchange Rates," The IUP Journal of Applied Economics, IUP Publications, vol. 0(6), pages 7-18, November.
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    21. Stefan Szymanski, 2010. "The Economic Design of Sporting Contests," Palgrave Macmillan Books, in: The Comparative Economics of Sport, chapter 1, pages 1-78, Palgrave Macmillan.
    22. Bester, Helmut & Konrad, Kai A., 2004. "Delay in contests," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 48(5), pages 1169-1178, October.
    23. Clark, Derek J. & Riis, Christian, 2000. "Allocation efficiency in a competitive bribery game," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 42(1), pages 109-124, May.
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    25. Lien, Da-Hsiang Donald, 1990. "Corruption and allocation efficiency," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 33(1), pages 153-164, July.
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    27. Milgrom, Paul R & Weber, Robert J, 1982. "A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(5), pages 1089-1122, September.
    28. Amann, Erwin & Leininger, Wolfgang, 1996. "Asymmetric All-Pay Auctions with Incomplete Information: The Two-Player Case," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 14(1), pages 1-18, May.
    29. Bresnahan, Timothy F & Reiss, Peter C, 1991. "Entry and Competition in Concentrated Markets," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 99(5), pages 977-1009, October.
    30. Krishna, Vijay & Morgan, John, 1997. "An Analysis of the War of Attrition and the All-Pay Auction," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 72(2), pages 343-362, February.
    31. Athey, Susan, 2001. "Single Crossing Properties and the Existence of Pure Strategy Equilibria in Games of Incomplete Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 69(4), pages 861-889, July.
    32. Roger B. Myerson, 1981. "Optimal Auction Design," Mathematics of Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 6(1), pages 58-73, February.
    33. А. Radygin., 2004. "Russia in 2000-2004: Heading towards State Capitalism?," VOPROSY ECONOMIKI, N.P. Redaktsiya zhurnala "Voprosy Economiki", vol. 4.
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Kräkel, Matthias, 2005. "Emotions and the Optimality of Unfair Tournaments," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 45, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
    2. Müller, Daniel, 2013. "The Doping Threshold in Sport Contests," Working papers 2013/05, Faculty of Business and Economics - University of Basel.
    3. Häfner, Samuel, 2012. "Clausewitz on Auctions," Working papers 2012/12, Faculty of Business and Economics - University of Basel.
    4. Rene Kirkegaard, 2008. "Favoritism in Contests: Head Starts and Handicaps," Working Papers 0805, Brock University, Department of Economics, revised Nov 2008.
    5. Gerd Muehlheusser & Sandra Schneemann & Dirk Sliwka, 2016. "The Impact Of Managerial Change On Performance: The Role Of Team Heterogeneity," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 54(2), pages 1128-1149, April.
    6. Dawid, Herbert & Muehlheusser, Gerd, 2012. "Repeated Selection with Heterogenous Individuals and Relative Age Effects," IZA Discussion Papers 6478, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    7. Martin Carree & Ingrid Verheul & Enrico Santarelli, 2011. "Sectoral patterns of firm exit in Italian provinces," Journal of Evolutionary Economics, Springer, vol. 21(3), pages 499-517, August.
    8. Christopher Cotton, 2010. "Evidence Revelation in Competitions for Access," Working Papers 2010-21, University of Miami, Department of Economics.
    9. Kathleen Cleeren & Frank Verboven & Marnik G. Dekimpe & Katrijn Gielens, 2010. "Intra- and Interformat Competition Among Discounters and Supermarkets," Marketing Science, INFORMS, vol. 29(3), pages 456-473, 05-06.
    10. Herbert Dawid & Gerd Muehlheusser, 2012. "Repeated Selection with Heterogenous Individuals and Relative Age Effects," CESifo Working Paper Series 3786, CESifo.
    11. Christopher Cotton, 2013. "Competing for the Attention of Policymakers," Working Papers 2013-14, University of Miami, Department of Economics.
    12. Dawid, Herbert & Muehlheusser, Gerd, 2015. "Repeated selection with heterogeneous individuals and relative age effects," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 116(C), pages 387-406.
    13. Minoru Kitahara & Ryo Ogawa, 2010. "All-Pay Auctions with Handicaps," ISER Discussion Paper 0781, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University, revised Jun 2010.
    14. Drugov, Mikhail & Ryvkin, Dmitry, 2017. "Biased contests for symmetric players," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 103(C), pages 116-144.
    15. Pastine, Tuvana & Pastine, Ivan, 2006. "Politician Preferences and Caps on Political Lobbying," CEPR Discussion Papers 5913, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    16. Kirkegaard, René, 2012. "Favoritism in asymmetric contests: Head starts and handicaps," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 76(1), pages 226-248.
    17. Häfner, Samuel, 2017. "A tug-of-war team contest," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 104(C), pages 372-391.
    18. Hodler, Roland & Yektaş, Hadi, 2012. "All-pay war," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 74(2), pages 526-540.
    19. HHironori Otsubo, 2012. "Contests with Incumbency Advantages: An Experiment Investigation of the Effect of Limits on Spending Behavior and Outcome," Jena Economics Research Papers 2012-020, Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena.
    20. Christopher Cotton, 2009. "Competition for Access and Full Revelation of Evidence," Working Papers 2010-12, University of Miami, Department of Economics.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    all-pay auctions; contests; asymmetric allocation rule; rent-seeking games; asymmetric information; D44; D88;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Auctions

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