1. Baye, M.R. & Kovenock, D. & De Vries, C., 1992. "The All-Pay Auction with Complete Information," Papers 8-92-1, Pennsylvania State - Department of Economics.
   Other versions:
   • Baye, Michael R. & Kovenock, Dan & Vries, Casper de, 1995. "The All-pay Auction with Complete Information," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo Group Munich.
   • Kovenock, D. & de Vries, C.G., 1995. "The All-Pay Auction with Complete Information," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 311.95, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC).
   • Baye, M.R. & Kovenock, D. & De Vries, C.G., 1991. "The All-Pay Auction With Complete Information," Purdue University Economics Working Papers 1007, Purdue University, Department of Economics.
   • Baye, M.R. & Kovenock, D. & De Varies, C.G., 1990. "The All-Pay Auction With Complete Information," Papers 9051, Tilburg - Center for Economic Research.
   • Dan Kovenock & Michael R. Baye & Casper G. de Vries, 1996. "The all-pay auction with complete information (*)," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 8(2), pages 291-305.
2. Grossman, Herschel I & Kim, Minseong, 1995. "Swords or Plowshares? A Theory of the Security of Claims to Property," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 103(6), pages 1275-88, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
3. Garfinkel, M.R. & Skaperdas, S., 2000. "Conflict without Misperceptions or Incomplete Information: how the Future Matters," Papers 99-00-11, California Irvine - School of Social Sciences.
   Other versions:
   • Michelle R Garfinkel & Stergios Skaperdas, 2001. "Conflict Without Misperceptions or Incomplete Information: How the Future Matters," Levine's Working Paper Archive 563824000000000011, David K. Levine. [Downloadable!]
4. Nahum D. Melumad & Dilip Mookherjee, 1989. "Delegation as Commitment: The Case of Income Tax Audits," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 20(2), pages 139-163, Summer. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
5. Arye L. Hillman & John G. Riley, 1987. "Politically Contestable Rents and Transfers," UCLA Economics Working Papers 452, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
6. Baye, M.R. & Kovenock, D. & De Vries, C.G., 1992. "Rigging the Lobbying Process: An Application of the All- Pay Auction," Papers 9-92-2, Pennsylvania State - Department of Economics.
   Other versions:
   • Baye, M.R. & Kovenock, D. & De Vries, C.G., 1991. "Rigging The Lobbying Process: An Application Of The All- Pay Auction," Purdue University Economics Working Papers 1002, Purdue University, Department of Economics.
   • Baye, Michael R & Kovenock, Dan & de Vries, Casper G, 1993. "Rigging the Lobbying Process: An Application of the All-Pay Auction," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 83(1), pages 289-94, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
7. Baik, Kyung Hwan & Kim, In-Gyu, 1997. "Delegation in contests," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 13(2), pages 281-298, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
8. Fershtman, Chaim & Kalai, Ehud, 1997. "Unobserved Delegation," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 38(4), pages 763-74, November.
   Other versions:
   • Fershtman, C. & Kalai, E., 1993. "Unobserved Delegation," Papers 10-93, Tel Aviv - the Sackler Institute of Economic Studies.
   • Chaim Fershtman & Ehud Kalai, 1993. "Unobserved Delegation," Discussion Papers 1043, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
9. Genicot, C. & Skaperdas, S., 2000. "Investing in Confict Management," Papers 00-01-17, California Irvine - School of Social Sciences.
10. Bester, Helmut & Konrad, Kai A, 2004. "Easy Targets and the Timing of Conflict," CEPR Discussion Papers 4245, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
    • Helmut Bester & Kai A. Konrad, 2003. "Easy Targets and the Timing of Conflict," cege – Center for European, Governance and Economic Development Research Discussion Papers 21, cege – Center for European, Governance and Economic Development Research, University of Goettingen (Germany).. [Downloadable!]
11. Clark, Derek J & Riis, Christian, 1998. "Competition over More Than One Prize," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 88(1), pages 276-89, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

Cited by:
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1. J. Atsu Amegashie, 2009. "Third-Party Intervention in Conflicts and the Indirect Samaritan's Dilemma," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo Group Munich. [Downloadable!]
2. J. Atsu Amegashie & Marco Runkel, 2008. "The Paradoxes of Revenge in Conflicts," Working Papers 0805, University of Guelph, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
   Other versions:
   • Amegashie, J. Atsu & Runkel, Marco, 2008. "The Paradoxes of Revenge in Conflicts," MPRA Paper 7687, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]
   • J. Atsu Amegashie & Marco Runkel, 2008. "The Paradoxes of Revenge in Conflicts," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo Group Munich. [Downloadable!]
3. Gregory Price, 2008. "NEA Presidential Address: Black Economists of the World You Cite!!," The Review of Black Political Economy, Springer, vol. 35(1), pages 1-12, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
4. Amegashie, J. Atsu & Runkel, Marco, 2008. "The Desire for Revenge and the Dynamics of Conflicts," MPRA Paper 6746, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 16 Jan 2008. [Downloadable!]