The Robustness of ‘Enemy-of-My-Enemy-is-My-Friend’ Alliances
AbstractThis paper examines the robustness of alliance formation in a three-player, two-stage game in which each of two players compete against a third player in disjoint sets of contests. Although the players with the common opponent share no common interests, we find that under the lottery contest success function (CSF) there exists a range of parameter configurations in which the players with the common opponent have incentive to form an alliance involving a pre-conflict transfer of resources. Models that utilize the lottery CSF typically yield qualitatively different results from those arising in models with the auction CSF (Fang 2002). However, under the lottery and the auction CSFs, the parameter configurations within which players with a common opponent form an alliance are closely related. Our results, thus, provide a partial robustness result for ‘enemy-of-my-enemy-is-my-friend’ alliances.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Purdue University, Department of Economics in its series Purdue University Economics Working Papers with number 1258.
Length: 21 pages
Date of creation: Oct 2010
Date of revision:
Alliance Formation; Contests; Economics of Alliances; Conflict;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- D74 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2010-11-27 (All new papers)
- NEP-EXP-2010-11-27 (Experimental Economics)
- NEP-GTH-2010-11-27 (Game Theory)
You can help add them by filling out this form.
CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Timo Hiller, 2012. "Friends and Enemies: A Model of Signed Network Formation," Bristol Economics Discussion Papers 12/629, Department of Economics, University of Bristol, UK.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Krannert PHD).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.